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Abstract
This paper shows that a negative shock to agricultural productivity may increase food
prices, and labor and capital can move away from manufacturing into agriculture to
meet the subsistence requirement for food. This effect depends on income levels and
openness to trade. Using annual manufacturing data and rainfall shocks as the instru-
ment for crop yields (proxy for agricultural productivity), I find that an exogenous
decline in yield decreases manufacturing output as well as employment and capital
investment in manufacturing. Overall, crop yield variation can explain up to 44% of
industrial output fluctuations in developing countries (rainfall shocks cause 31% of the
fluctuations). Lastly, this paper shows that such perverse phenomena, in which re-
sources move toward the sector with declining productivity, can lead to a significant
reduction in aggregate productivity.
JEL codes: F1, E32, O11; Key words: Economic Fluctuations, International Trade,
Development, International Comparisons, Agriculture
1 Introduction
An important regularity in macroeconomic data is the frequent and large changes in
developing country growth rates, compared to the relatively stable growth rates in devel-
oped countries (Lucas, 1988). Accordingly, many authors have focused on the negative
relationship between aggregate output volatility, defined as the standard deviation of yearly
output growth rates, and per capita income levels. The negative association between the
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two becomes stronger when manufacturing is considered separately, implying much higher
industrial output volatility in poor countries.1
Higher industrial output volatility can have negative effects on both the level and the
growth path of income.2 Importantly, abrupt negative shocks to household incomes can be
especially detrimental in developing countries, as their income levels often barely exceed the
level of subsistence (Burgess, Deschenes, Donaldson, and Greenstone, 2013; Bhalotora, 2010;
Maccini and Yang, 2009). Moreover, developing countries are less able to withstand income
fluctuations due to their underdeveloped financial sectors and weaker coping and mitigating
mechanisms. For these reasons, analyzing the causes of fluctuations is important, especially
for developing countries.
This paper is part of a growing literature that studies year-to-year fluctuations of in-
dustrial output in less developed countries.3 An important paper by Koren and Tenreyro
(2007) decomposes volatility across countries, and shows that output is more volatile in poor
countries mainly because they specialize in fewer and highly volatile sectors and are subject
to larger country-specific shocks. In addition, many authors attempt to provide underlying
mechanisms by relying on differences in the complexity of production process, differences
in institutions, or differences in the risk content of exports and imports (e.g., Koren and
Tenreyro, 2013; Krishna and Levchenko, 2012; Malik and Temple, 2009; Cunat and Melitz,
2012; Kraay and Ventura, 2007; Kose, 2002; Giovanni and Levchenko, 2011; Tapia, 2012).
For example, Koren and Tenreyro (2013) theoretically show that firms in developed coun-
tries have diversification benefits from using a greater number of input varieties, lowering
output volatility. Developing countries also tend to have poor institutional ability to enforce
contracts, which may lead to a comparative advantage in less complex products that are
associated with higher output volatility (Krishna and Levchenko, 2012).
In contrast, this paper focuses on the demand-side reasons to explain the volatility in in-
dustrial output. I use a prominent characteristic of developing economies – the large portion
of income spent on food to satisfy subsistence needs – and show how agricultural shocks can
generate large industrial output fluctuations through general equilibrium linkages. In the
baseline model, the effects are stronger for lower income countries, because non-homothetic
preferences magnify the consequences of falling agricultural yields in these countries. On
the other hand, the volatility literature does not use non-homothetic preferences, only con-
1Regressing volatilities (over the period 1970-2002) on log per capita GDP and log population reveals
that a 10% decrease in per capita GDP is associated with a 0.3 unit (30 percent of the total GDP) increase
in industrial output volatility and a 0.07 unit increase in aggregate output volatility (see Table A.1).
2Van Wijnbergen (1984) notes that even a temporary decline in manufacturing can have a permanent neg-
ative impact on an economy, assuming that growth occurs through learning-by-doing technological progress.
In addition, Ramey and Ramey (1991) argue that volatility can reduce mean output ex-post if producers
have to make decisions on resources before realizations of shocks. Bernanke (1983) and Pindyck (1991)
suggest that volatility can cause lower investments.
3More broadly, it belongs to the literature that studies determinants of output volatility. Giovanni and
Levchenko (2009), Kose (2002), and Mendoza (1995) investigate the relationship between trade openness and
output volatility. Recent studies tend to focus on the effect of firm-level idiosyncratic shocks on aggregate
fluctuations (Gabaix, 2011; Giovanni and Levchenko, 2012; Giovanni et al., 2014).
2
tains manufacturing-type sectors in the models, and relies mainly on the size of shocks (e.g.,
productivity shocks and world price shocks) or different elasticities of factor supply (due to
different institutions) to explain volatility levels across countries. Another very important
departure from the previous literature is that I use a clearly observable source of shocks,
rainfall shocks.4 This allows me to measure the size of the shocks across countries as well as
the actual response to the shocks on manufacturing.5
To develop the idea, I build a two-sector static general equilibrium model featuring Stone-
Geary preferences with subsistence requirements for food. The baseline model assumes a
closed economy, which can be partly justified by low agricultural trade volumes in the real
world with high barriers to agricultural trade. In the model, a negative shock to agricul-
tural productivity, such as a drought, causes food prices to rise. The expenditure on the
subsistence requirement for food then rises, and there will be less income leftover for manu-
facturing. This leads poor households to shift consumption away from manufactures. On the
production side, in order to meet the subsistence requirement in the face of the decreasing
agricultural productivity, some labor and capital resources move away from manufacturing
into agriculture, further reducing manufacturing output. Perversely, the economy shifts re-
sources toward the sector with declining productivity, leading to a significant reduction in
aggregate productivity. This effect becomes stronger the closer the country is to the subsis-
tence level.
To understand the quantitative importance of the theoretical mechanisms, I calibrate
the model using data on endowments, employment shares, and total output across countries.
Time varying cross-country data on crop yield is used as a measure of agricultural produc-
tivity. The simulation results confirm that the model generates significantly higher volatility
in poor countries in response to agricultural productivity shocks.
I turn to panel regressions to look for evidence of these effects in the data. I investigate
whether a fall in crop yield leads to a fall in industrial output (excluding the sectors that
use agricultural products as primary inputs), as predicted by the baseline model. However,
yields and manufacturing output may co-move due to some factors outside the model. For
example, an economy-wide rise in total factor productivity will boost productivity and out-
put in all sectors. This generates a positive relationship between yields and manufacturing
output. On the other hand, government policies that favor agriculture may attract labor
and capital resources into agriculture and away from manufacturing. This could cause crop
yields to rise and manufacturing output to decline, generating a negative correlation.
To address the endogeneity issue, I use cross-country panel data which includes 118 coun-
tries for the period 1970-2002, and regress changes in manufacturing output on changes in
4The previous literature rarely attempts to measure the size of shocks and econometrically estimate the
response to the shocks that cause industrial output fluctuations. Instead, it focuses on variance decomposi-
tion, calibration, or estimating the relationship between the volatility and some country characteristics such
as the complexity of products, trade openness, financial development, or policy variables.
5Burgess and Donaldson (2012) also use rainfall shocks in India to study volatility, but the implication
is mainly associated with agriculture.
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yield, employing rainfall shocks as the instrument for yields. I construct crop-area weighted
rainfall using GIS (Geographic Information System) software, which has strong predictive
power for crop yields in the first stage. In the second stage, I find that exogenous declines
in yield cause significant reductions in manufacturing output in developing countries: a 10%
decrease in yield can lead to a 3.1% decrease in manufacturing output. Overall, crop yield
variation can explain up to 44% of industrial output fluctuations in developing countries
(rainfall shocks through yields cause 31% of the fluctuations). On the other hand, consistent
with the theory, I find that the effect disappears for higher-income countries. In addition, I
find that the effect is larger when a country is less open to trade, when financial development
is low, and when agriculture production as a share of GDP is large, which corroborates the
theory.
Moreover, I find two main pieces of evidence for the model’s key mechanism. First, I find
that exogenous declines in crop yield result in significant declines in both employment and
capital investment in manufacturing in developing countries. The labor reallocation channel
is especially important, because developing countries are labor abundant and most indus-
tries are labor intensive. Importantly, I show that the labor reallocation effect is stronger for
countries whose planting cycles are seasonal rather than year-round: a 10% decrease in yield
can lead to a 3.5% decrease in manufacturing employment in northern-hemisphere countries.
To illustrate, an agricultural worker in a northern-hemisphere country has an incentive to
move to other sectors after the harvest in the fall, because there is not much work to do
until the next harvest season. This evidence strongly supports the mechanism proposed by
the theory. Second, using cross-country time-series data on annual crop prices, I find that
domestic rainfall shocks significantly affect domestic food prices despite the existence of the
world food market.6
Lastly, I turn back to the theory. I extend the baseline model and present two types of
open-economy models to study how international trade may affect the prediction differently.
First, in a two-country model, I demonstrate that the positive link between agricultural
productivity and manufacturing output is attenuated in home country as the size of foreign
country increases, and the link eventually changes sign (becoming a negative link).7 Second,
I build another open economy model in which foreign agricultural products are imperfect
substitutes of home products, which allows imperfect pass-through of domestic productivity
shocks to domestic food prices. I find that the direction of the closed economy results still
holds, but the magnitudes of the effects are attenuated. Using these results, I show that trade
openness may help mitigate the impact of agricultural shocks on aggregate output. This im-
plication is in line with papers by Tombe (2015), Gollin and Rogerson (2014), Burgess and
6This finding is consistent with the literature showing that the domestic supply shock is the main
contributing factor for short-run (changes within a year) food price fluctuations, while long-run price fluc-
tuations are primarily attributed to international prices or exchange rates (Burgess, Deschenes, Donaldson,
and Greenstone, 2013; Anderson and Nelgen, 2012; Loening et al., 2009).
7Under the small open economy with fixed world prices, a decrease in agricultural productivity induces
resources to move toward manufacturing, which has become relatively more productive.
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Donaldson (2012), Uy et al. (2013), and Caselli et al. (2012), who argue that reductions
in trade barriers not only lead to lower fractions of the workforce employed in subsistence
agriculture characterized by low productivity, but also lessen real income volatility.8
Another closely related study is the paper by Dell, Jones, and Olken (2012). The authors
identify the effects of yearly fluctuations in temperature on economic growth, and show that
the effects are stronger in poor countries. Using an empirical framework that involves long
lags of temperature, the authors focus on testing the existence of the level effect (e.g.,“the
effect of current temperature on crop yields”) and the growth effect (e.g.,“the effect on fea-
tures, such as institutions that influence productivity growth”). My paper complements
their findings by providing evidence for the underlying mechanisms with the data analysis
linking weather shocks, the price channel, factor reallocations, and output, which is in line
with the proposed general equilibrium theory.
Many papers in the empirical development literature use rainfall shocks as a source of
exogenous income shocks in developing countries (e.g., Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti,
2004; Jayachandran, 2006; Burgess and Donaldson, 2012; Burgess, Deschenes, Donaldson,
and Greenstone, 2013). In those papers, implications of how rainfall shocks affect aggregate
income are limited within agriculture, even though agriculture is only a part of the economies
(the average share of agriculture in 2008 was 24% in low-income countries with per capita
income less than $4,000). This paper contributes to this literature by suggesting a system-
atic mechanism in which rainfall shocks can affect not only agriculture but also other sectors
through general equilibrium linkages.
This paper is also closely related to the literature on structural change and the role of
agriculture in economic development (Gollin and Rogerson, 2014; Kevin Donovan, 2014;
Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi, 2013; Lagakos and Waugh, 2013; Restuccia, Yang,
and Zhu, 2008; Gollin et al., 2002, 2007; Laitner, 2000; Matsuyama, 1991). Those papers
focus primarily on the long-term growth path toward an industrialized economy (or growth
of service sectors) beyond subsistence food production, or on explaining certain static eco-
nomic characteristics of developing countries (such as low agricultural productivity and high
agricultural employment shares, compared to developed countries).9 My paper differs from
the literature in that I focus on the differing impact of productivity shocks on short-run
output fluctuations across poor and rich countries and econometrically estimate the channel
using observable and exogenous shocks.
Like this paper, Colmer (2016) and Santangelo (2016) also investigate how shocks to
agriculture affect manufacturing, but within districts in India. A distinct difference from
8David Atkin (2012), on the other hand, demonstrates that short-run gains from agricultural trade
liberalization are limited because of household preferences that are biased toward locally abundant foods.
9Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008) explain poor countries’ large shares of employment in agriculture
and low aggregate productivity using a two-sector model featuring Stone-Geary preferences. Matsuyama
(1990) and Gollin et al. (2007) also use a two-sector model with the same type of preferences to study the
central role of agricultural productivity in economic development. Kevin Donovan (2014) argues that, given
uninsurable shocks, being close to the subsistence level causes poor countries to use less intermediate inputs,
which amplifies differences in agricultural productivity between poor and rich countries.
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my paper is that their analysis is done at the level of districts (within a country) which can
be considered as small open economies, while this paper uses data on countries which are
relatively closed to trade, especially in agriculture. Accordingly, Colmer (2016) finds that a
reduction in agricultural productivity (caused by increases in temperature) causes workers
to move into casual manufacturing activities, which is consistent with the prediction of the
small open economy model in this paper. Santangelo (2016), on the other hand, focuses on
locally traded goods. She finds that a negative productivity shock caused by rainfall short-
ages lowers local demand and reduces firm production and employment, which is consistent
with the baseline model prediction in this paper. In sum, this paper provides macroeconomic
evidence with varying degrees of the income effect depending on countrywide characteristics
such as income levels, financial development, agricultural seasonality, trade openness, and
so on, while those papers focus on microeconomic evidence within a single country.
Lastly, Da-Rocha and Restuccia (2006) also use a two-sector model in which one sector’s
productivity shocks affect the other sectors’ output through general equilibrium linkages.
They show that aggregate output volatility increases with the share of agriculture in the
economy due to the increasing amount of intra-temporal substitution of consumption across
sectors. However, the key mechanism is different in my paper, as it is primarily the income
effect that causes fluctuations in output. While those authors use homothetic preferences,
I use non-homothetic preferences, and in my model, income effects dominate substitution
effects.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 builds a two-sector general
equilibrium model and describes the mechanisms through which agricultural productivity
affects manufacturing output. Section 3 presents quantitative analysis to study the magni-
tudes of the effects across countries. Section 4 describes the econometric estimation strategy
and data, and section 5 discusses the estimation results. Section 6 presents open economy
models. Section 7 offers concluding remarks.
2 Two-Sector General Equilibrium Model
This section builds a static general-equilibrium model with two sectors: agriculture and
manufacturing. Both sectors employ two factors, labor (L) and capital (K), which are as-
sumed to be perfectly mobile within a country so that in equilibrium there will be one wage
rate (w) and one capital rental rate (r) in a country. This section assumes a closed economy,
which is partly justified by low agricultural trade volumes in the real world, where govern-
ments impose barriers to agricultural trade to protect domestic markets from international
price variability (e.g., Anderson and Nelgen, 2012; Gouel, 2012).10 There exists L mass of
population, each endowed with one unit of labor and K
L
units of capital. In this section, I
assume L = 1 for simplicity.
10Two other reasons are: (1) biased consumer preferences toward locally abundant foods (Atkin, 2012),
(2) high transportation costs, since food is bulky and heavy (Tombe, 2015; Gollin and Rogerson, 2014; Caselli
et al., 2012).
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I assume a perfectly competitive economy with many small identical firms in each sector.
The production technology of each sector is represented by the Cobb-Douglas production
function:
Yi = fi(Ki, Li) = ziK
βi
i L
1−βi
i , i = a,m, (1)
where zi denotes industry i specific total factor productivity (TFP), Ka + Km = K, and
La + Lm = L. Given the prices, each sector chooses Ki and Li to maximize profits,
pii = pifi(Ki, Li)− wLi − rKi.
In Appendix C, I present a model using a new agricultural production function that incor-
porates land and intermediate inputs, and show that the key implication of the model is
unchanged.
On the demand side, a representative agent has a CES utility function with a subsistence
requirement for agricultural goods γa (CES Stone-Geary preference),
U = [α(qa − γa)(σ−1)/σ + (1− α)q(σ−1)/σm ]σ/(σ−1), 0 < α < 1 and σ > 0, (2)
where α and (1−α) are utility weights over the two goods; σ is the elasticity of substitution.
The agent earns income I = wL+rK by inelastically supplying L units of labor and lending
K units of capital. The budget constraint is given by paqa + qm = I, where pa is the price
of the agricultural good relative to manufacturing, and the manufacturing price is normal-
ized to unity. Solving the utility maximization problem yields the following manufacturing
expenditure equation:
Em = α̂m(σ, pa) · (I − paγa), (3)
where α̂m(σ, pa) =
(1−α)σ
ασp1−σa +(1−α)σ . α̂m(σ, pa) indicates the share of residual income spent on
manufacturing, and α̂m(σ, pa) → (1 − α), as σ → 1. The representative agent first spends
paγa for γa units of the agricultural good, and then allocates the residual income I − paγa to
the two goods depending on the weights, α̂m(σ, pa) and α̂a(σ, pa)(= 1− α̂m(σ, pa)).
Given the above setup, I first assume σ = 1 in the following subsection. The CES pref-
erence then becomes a simple Cobb-Douglas preference, which enables me to algebraically
identify key mechanisms in the general equilibrium outcome. I then briefly explore the gen-
eral case in subsection 2.2.
2.1 Baseline Model (σ = 1)
The CES Stone-Geary utility function converges to the following Cobb-Douglas Stone-
Geary function as σ → 1:
U = (qa − γa)αq1−αm , 0 < α < 1. (4)
Equation (3) shows that the weight α̂m(σ = 1, pa) becomes (1 − α), which is constant and
no longer depends on the agricultural price; thus Em = (1− α) · (I − paγa).
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To uncover the key properties of Stone-Geary preferences, I examine the food price elas-
ticity and income elasticity of expenditure on manufacturing, which are given by:
ηpa =
∂Em
∂pa
pa
Em
= − paγa
I − paγa (5)
ηI =
∂Em
∂I
I
Em
=
I
I − paγa (6)
First, note that the signs of the two elasticities are opposite. The expenditure on manufac-
turing decreases with the food price, while it increases with the level of income. In fact, (5)
implies (6), as an increase in food prices means a decrease in the residual income I−paγa. In
this expenditure system, the income is split into a subsistence income component paγa and
a residual income component I − paγa. With σ = 1, food prices affect the division of income
into these components, but do not affect the share of residual income spent on manufacturing
(which is simply the utility weight 1 − α). Second, the magnitudes of the two elasticities
become arbitrarily large when I gets close to the subsistence level paγa. This implies that
shocks to food prices or to income will translate into larger fluctuations of manufacturing
demand in poor countries. This income effect is the key feature of the model that causes dif-
fering patterns of volatility in poor and rich countries. Lastly, as I tends to infinity, ηpa and
ηI approach zero and one, respectively, as the minimum expenditure requirement becomes
negligible compared to the level of income.
Competitive equilibrium and the effect of a change in agricultural productivity on manu-
facturing — Next, I derive equilibrium solutions and study how changes in agricultural pro-
ductivity affect equilibrium manufacturing output differently in poor and rich countries. The
competitive equilibrium of the closed economy is a set of allocations {La, Lm, Ka, Km, qa, qm}
and prices {w, r, pa}, such that, given the prices, (1) {qa, qm} solve the utility maximization
problem of the representative agent, (2) {La, Lm, Ka, Km} solve the profit maximization
problem of each sector, and (3) all markets clear. Each equilibrium allocation can then be
expressed by the eight parameters, K,L, za, zm, βa, βM , α, and γa.
The model structure implies that changes in za can affect manufacturing output only
through the reallocation of labor and capital resources. Thus, I study either the solution for
Lm or Km. Appendix A.1 shows that the implicit solution for Lm is given by:
1
za
· γa
Kβa
= G(Lm), (7)
where G(Lm) =
L−λ−1·Lm
[L+
(βm−βa)
βa(1−βm)Lm]
βa
and λ = (1−α)(1−βm)
(1−α)(1−βm)+α(1−βa) . Equation (7) is not a closed
form solution, but it allows for convenient interpretation. We can verify that the value of
function G decreases with Lm by taking the derivative of G. This implies that equilibrium
labor allocation for manufacturing Lm increases with agricultural productivity za, leading
to the positive link between agricultural productivity and manufacturing output. That is,
a decrease in za pulls resources out of manufacturing and into agriculture in order to meet
the subsistence requirement, reducing manufacturing output. Equation (7) also implies that
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Lm decreases with
γa
KβA
, which is the subsistence requirement relative to per capita capital
stock. In other words, the higher the subsistence requirement relative to income, the lower
the manufacturing output. The same patterns hold true for Km, as it is positively correlated
with Lm (see Appendix A.1).
Having shown the directional impact of agricultural productivity on resource realloca-
tions, I next recall the main question of this paper: Does industrial output fluctuate more
in poor countries in response to changes in agricultural productivity? This is equivalent
to asking whether the elasticity of manufacturing output with respect to agricultural pro-
ductivity is higher in low-income countries. It has been seen that food price elasticity of
manufacturing demand decreases with income levels. Similar patterns hold in the general
equilibrium context. Equation (7) shows that the greater γa
Kβa
(which can be viewed as a
magnification effect) is, the larger is the fluctuation of Lm in response to changes in za. Put
differently, the elasticity of labor (and capital) in manufacturing with respect to za decreases
with income levels, which also implies that the elasticity of manufacturing output decreases
with income levels. This is the key observation in this model, which leads to higher lev-
els of industrial output volatility in poor countries. Another important implication is that
resources are moving toward agriculture when agricultural productivity is declining. Such
reallocation of resources can result in a large reduction in aggregate productivity (see Ap-
pendix B and compare with the open economy case). I summarize the key implications of
the baseline model as follows:
Implication 1: Labor and capital move away from manufacturing and into agriculture in
response to a decrease in agricultural productivity. This effect decreases with income levels.
Implication 2: The elasticity of manufacturing output with respect to agricultural produc-
tivity is positive and decreases with income levels.
Implication 3: A decrease in agricultural productivity can lead to a significant reduction
in aggregate productivity as resources move toward the sector with declining productivity.
This effect decreases with income levels.
The first two implications will remain as core theoretical predictions throughout this pa-
per. Section 3.2 will show that calibration results of the original model generate the same
implications, although σ 6= 1 may weaken or strengthen the effects. Hence, in the following
subsection I investigate how σ interacts with the income effect, and derive generalized equi-
librium solutions.
2.2 CES Stone-Geary Preferences (σ 6= 1)
In the baseline model, the distinct feature of the Cobb-Douglas Stone-Geary preference
is that consumers spend constant shares (α and 1 − α) of their residual income I − paγa
on food and manufactures, regardless of changes in prices. However, when σ 6= 1, Equation
(3) indicates that the weight α̂m(σ, pa) depends on the agricultural price as well as sigma.
Using Equation (3), I obtain the food price elasticity of manufacturing expenditure as follows:
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ηpa,CES =
∂Em
∂pa
pa
Em
= (σ − 1) ασp1−σa
ασp1−σa +(1−α)σ −
paγa
I−paγa
= (σ − 1)α̂a(σ, pa)︸ ︷︷ ︸
substitution effect
+ ηpa︸︷︷︸
income effect
,
(8)
where ηpa is the food price elasticity (which is a function of income) in the Cobb-Douglas
case (see Equation (5)).
The first term (substitution effect) is negative when σ < 1, and it is positive when σ > 1.
Meanwhile, the second term (income effect) is negative and clearly decreases with income
levels. More specifically, when σ < 1 (σ > 1), a rise in the food price pa generates the
two effects: (1) the substitution effect raises (lowers) the share of residual income spent on
food, and lowers (raises) the expenditure on manufacturing; (2) the income effect lowers the
residual income, and lowers the expenditure on manufactures. Since pa is inversely related to
za, a decrease in za will decrease (increase) α̂m(σ, pa) and decrease I − paγa. In other words,
σ < 1 increases the income effect, while σ > 1 abates the income effect. Note that as σ
approaches 1 the substitution effect goes away and ηpa,CES approaches ηpa . When I becomes
arbitrarily large, the income effect disappears and only the substitution effect remains.
Finally, solving the model with the original setup (as described in the beginning of section
2) yields the following implicit solution for Lm (see Appendix A.2 for the derivation):
1
za
· γa
Kβa
= G˜(Lm), (9)
where G˜(Lm) =
L−λ2(pa)−1·Lm
[L+
(βm−βa)
βa(1−βm)Lm]
βa
; λ2(pa(Lm)) =
α̂m(σ,pa)(1−βm)
α̂m(σ,pa)(1−βm)+α̂a(σ,pa)(1−βa)
; pa(Lm) =
zmβm
zaβa
[βa(1−βm)L+(βm−βa)Lm
K
]βa−βm [βm(1 − βa)]βm−1[βa(1 − βm)]1−βa . This implicit
solution looks similar to the solution of the baseline model (Equation (7)) except that the
constant utility weight α of the Cobb-Douglas preference is now a function of pa and σ. The
next subsection will show that the baseline model simulation results are robust to using this
CES model given relevant parameter values, since the income effect dominates the substitu-
tion effect.
3 Quantitative Analysis
This section complements the theory with numerical results, in order to see how much
output change the model can generate across countries and investigate whether the magni-
tudes of the effects are significant and plausible. I calibrate the model using basic economic
features across countries such as endowments, productivity, employment shares, and total
output in agriculture and manufacturing. I then examine effects of agricultural productivity
shocks on resource reallocations and manufacturing output by simulating the equilibrium
solutions. The key questions in this section are: (1) How does a change in agricultural
productivity affect resource reallocations differently depending on income levels? (2) How
do such resource reallocations affect manufacturing output? (3) What are the quantitative
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predictions about output volatility? The first two subsections present results on the baseline
model, followed by another subsection that discusses results with σ 6= 1.
3.1 Baseline Model Calibration
Recall that each equilibrium allocation (La, Lm, Ka, Km, qa, qm) is a function of the eight
parameters, K,L, za, zm, βa, βM , α, and γa. The total amount of labor L is normalized to 1.
Per capita capital stock K across countries is constructed based on the investment data of
the Penn World Table 7.1 and is normalized by Ethiopia’s.11 Ethiopia is chosen to be a base
country, as it is one of the poorest countries in UNIDO (2011) manufacturing data, and its
per capita income is close to the lower poverty line ($275 in 1989 US dollars) proposed by
the World Bank (1990).12 The production function indexes βm and βa, which are capital
income shares in each sector, are set to 0.58 and 0.32, respectively, according to the GTAP
(2007) input-output table of India.13 The capital income share in manufacturing/agriculture
is calculated as the ratio of the value of capital stock to the sum of capital stock value and
labor compensation value in the sector.
Next, we need a series of shocks to agricultural productivity {za,t}t=2002t=1970 for each country.
Yield (production per hectare of land) is often used as a measure of productivity, but it also
depends on inputs.14 To justify the usage of yields for agricultural total factor productivity
(TFP) in the model, I assume that each unit of land uses a fixed amount of input combination
(c = kβaa,tl
1−βa
a,t , where c is constant), and the total area of land varies depending on the total
amount of input combination in agriculture (cZt = K
βa
a,tL
1−βa
a,t , where Zt is land). This way,
za,t is directly proportional to yield. Assuming this, the yearly values of za,t for each country
are set at each country’s annual cereal yields (measured as kilograms per hectare of harvested
land, including wheat, rice, maize, etc.; taken from the FAO) for the period 1970-2002 and
are divided by Ethiopia’s minimum cereal yield, which is 974kg/hectare. Although cereal
production is only a part of agriculture, I assume that its productivity is highly associated
with production of other plants and animals (animals are fed with cereals and plants). The
average za,t (during 1970-2002) for the U.S. is about 4.5, which implies that agricultural
productivity in the U.S. is more than four times as high as Ethiopia’s. Meanwhile, zm is
set to be a free parameter that matches each country’s income earned from agriculture and
manufacturing. zm for Ethiopia is normalized to 1, and zm for other countries are set at
those values so that the income levels implied by the benchmark model are the same as the
real per capita income data normalized by Ethiopia’s.
11I assume initial capital stock in 1960 to be twice the total GDP and the annual capital depreciation
rate to be 6%.
12Defining a proper base country is important in the model with preferences featuring a subsistent re-
quirement in order to avoid corner solutions. All other parameter values are also assigned to ensure interior
solutions for all countries.
13I choose India to obtain factor income shares because this paper focuses on developing countries. The
country size is big enough, so the equilibrium economic outcome is less likely to be driven by some country-
specific characteristics.
14Note that one cannot plug yield values for output in the model equation to obtain za, because output
has to be an equilibrium outcome.
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The Stone-Geary utility weight α can be interpreted as food expenditure share when the
subsistence level relative to income is negligible. However, it is hard to define and obtain
actual food expenditure data because, for example, food away from home includes service.
Thus, I instead use employment data and Equation (7), which gives an equilibrium solution
for employment in manufacturing, to calibrate both α and the subsistence requirement γa.
The manufacturing employment share (out of total employment in agriculture and manu-
facturing) for the U.S. in year 2004 is 91%, while it is only 7% in Ethiopia.15 I plug these
numbers back into Lm in Equation (7), with country-specific K and za for the U.S. and
Ethiopia, and obtain two equations with two unknown variables α and γa. Solving for α and
γa yields α ≈ 0.018 and γa ≈ 0.891.
Note that whether a country is poor or rich in the model is determined by the given values
of capital stock Kc (c denotes a country), manufacturing productivity zm,c, and an average
value of agricultural productivity za,c. With these, the two-sector model with Stone-Geary
preferences can generate the fact that the expenditure share for the subsistence requirement
tends to decrease with income levels. For example, it is 89% in Ethiopia, while it is only
4% in the U.S. (see column 3 of Table 2). To summarize, Table 1 presents the assigned
parameter values and the data source.
3.2 Quantitative Results (Baseline Model)
Given the calibrated parameters, this section presents simulation results of the baseline
model. First, I study how a 15% agricultural productivity shock affects manufacturing out-
put.16 Second, I consider a series of shocks, given by the cross-country time-series data on
crop yields. I then calculate volatilities of simulated manufacturing output.
In the model, levels of total capital stock and productivity determine the level of eco-
nomic development. As can be seen from the first two columns of Table 2, a country’s
capital stock and average value of agricultural productivity (denoted as za,c, where c is a
country) are roughly increasing with the country’s income level. Based on those values and
other calibrated parameters, column 3 reports numerical results on the shares of subsistence
requirement out of total income (paγa
I
) across countries. Since a poor country spends a high
portion of its income for the subsistence food requirement, on the production side a large
share of labor and capital resources has to be devoted to agriculture (see column 4 of Table
2, where L∗a = 1− L∗m).
A 15% productivity shock — We now consider a 15% decline in agricultural productivity.
Equilibrium agricultural prices rise in all countries by about 20% (column 5 of Table 2). Due
to the increases in agricultural prices, labor and capital resources move toward agriculture for
15Admittedly, more than 80% of the total employment works in service sectors in the U.S. However,
the model assumes only agriculture and manufacturing, and a decline in agricultural productivity is pulling
factors only out of manufacturing (not services). One way to solve this problem is to treat manufacturing
and services as an aggregate.
16Note that the average value of annual percentage change in crop yield was 14.7% across countries in
the sample.
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higher profits, leading to reductions in employment and capital in manufacturing (columns
6 and 7). As a result, manufacturing output decreases in all countries, and the magnitude
of output change decreases with income levels due to decreasing income effects (column 8
of Table 2). An important point is that the baseline model is able to generate significant
differences in magnitudes across countries. For example, manufacturing output decreases by
17% in Ghana, whereas it decreases only by 0.6% in the U.S.17
Table 2 shows that some resources will be reallocated toward the sector with declining
productivity. How would this affect aggregate productivity? In Appendix B, I decompose
the changes in aggregate TFP into the productivity effect (within-sector effect) and the share
effect (between-sector effect). I show that the share effect is negative due to the movement of
resources toward agriculture with declining productivity. For example, in Ethiopia, the share
effect is −2.2% out of a −13.5% change in aggregate TFP, and the effect becomes negligible
in rich countries (see Table A.6). In contrast, if one assumes an open economy which allows
resources to move into the sector with increasing productivity the share effect can become
positive, which substantially lessens the reduction of aggregate TFP (from −13.5% to −7.6%
in Ethiopia, for example).
Volatility: a series of shocks to yields — I turn to measuring volatility of manufacturing
output, using the cross-country time-series data on crop yields as a series of agricultural
productivity shocks. In the baseline model, the manufacturing output volatility of a country
can be large when the size of shocks is large and when the country’s income is close to the
subsistence level. First, I measure the size of shocks by calculating the standard deviation
of growth rates in crop yield, which I call crop yield volatility (column 1 of Table 3). Among
the selected countries in Table 3, Malawi exhibits the highest yield volatility at 45.8%, while
Bangladesh exhibits the lowest at 5.6%.
Given the country-specific shocks, we can calculate manufacturing output volatility based
on the simulation results of the baseline model. Consistent with the theory, poor countries
tend to exhibit higher levels of manufacturing output volatility (column 2 of Table 3). Ad-
mittedly, for some poor African countries, the magnitudes of simulated volatilities are larger
than the volatilities directly calculated from the data (see columns 2-3). One reason for this
might be the closed economy assumption in the baseline model. In section 6, I show how the
magnitudes can be attenuated in open economy models. Lastly, note that countries that are
subject to large shocks exhibit higher manufacturing output volatility. For example, even
though Portugal is much richer than Bangladesh, Portugal’s implied volatility is slightly
higher, mainly because crop yield volatility is three times higher in Portugal.18
17The result shows that output decreases by more than 50% in Ethiopia. This is mainly because Ethiopia
serves as a base country whose income is set to be right above the subsistence level. As shown in equations
(5) and (6), the effect can be very large when the income is close to the subsistence level.
18It is also partially due to the lower agricultural productivity in Portugal; as shown in Table 2, the
average yield in Portugal is 1.77 while it is 2.36 in Bangladesh.
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3.3 Quantitative Results (CES Stone-Geary Preferences)
In this subsection, I re-simulate the general equilibrium solutions of the CES model (see
Equation (9)) with varying σ and compare them with the baseline model results. Herren-
dorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2013) estimate the elasticity of substitution in consumption
across agriculture, manufacturing, and service sectors to be 0.85. Meanwhile, Da-Rocha
and Restuccia’s (2006) estimated elasticity of substitution between agriculture and non-
agriculture is 0.52 in a model with a homothetic preference. However, I presume that it is
also possible for σ to be larger than 1 when it comes to the preference regarding agriculture
and manufacturing with a subsistence requirement. Accordingly, I set σ = 0.52, 0.85, 2.5,
and for all other parameters I use the same values as listed in Table 1 for comparison with
the baseline model results.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 show that, for σ = 0.52, 0.85 < 1, manufacturing output
decreases only slightly more compared to the baseline model case, in response to a 15%
decrease in za. In Ghana, manufacturing output declines by 17.235% in the baseline model,
while it decreases by 17.32% (18.441%) when σ = 0.85 (σ = 0.52) in the CES model. Note
that the total effect on manufacturing output equals the sum of the income effect (causing
a positive link between za and qm) and the substitution effect (also causing a positive link
when σ < 1). This implies that the substitution effect resulted in only about 0.1% decrease
in manufacturing output in response to the increase in food prices.
When σ = 2.5 > 1, on the other hand, manufacturing output decreases slightly less com-
pared to the baseline model case (column 4 of Table 4). With σ = 2.5, substitution effect
resulted in an increase of about 0.001% in manufacturing output in response to the increase
in food prices. Note that due to the small utility weight attached to agricultural products
(α ≈ 0.018), the substitution effect caused by agricultural shocks is also small. I show in
Appendix A.2 that interesting volatility patterns can be generated when α becomes 0.5.
In sum, the baseline model simulation results are close to the results using CES prefer-
ences with parameters in appropriate ranges, as the income effect dominates the substitution
effect.
4 Econometric Estimation
4.1 Empirical Strategy: Instrumental Variable Approach
The baseline model suggests that a decrease in agricultural productivity shifts resources
away from manufacturing and into agriculture, thus reducing manufacturing output (positive
link between agricultural productivity and manufacturing output). This effect decreases
with income level. To test these predictions, we need exogenous movements in agricultural
productivity which vary across countries and time. I use crop yields as a proxy for agricultural
productivity, and capture exogenous variation in yields using rainfall shocks.
Main estimating equation — The unit of observation is a country c in a given year t,
and the main estimating equation is,
∆qmc,t = αc + αt + β0 + β1 ·∆yieldc,t + β2 ·∆yieldc,t−1 + c,t , (10)
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where ∆qmc,t = ln
qmc,t
qmc,t−1
; qmc,t and yieldct denote manufacturing output and crop yield in coun-
try c in year t; αc is a country fixed effect that captures country-specific time trends of
manufacturing output such as technological progress; αt is a time-fixed effect; and c,t is an
idiosyncratic error term.
Using the simple framework, I test whether the coefficient β1 or β2 is significantly posi-
tive and whether the effect is larger in less-developed economies. Note that including income
levels interacted with yield growth is avoided due to multicollinearity with other important
variables such as the share of agriculture, the level of financial development, and openness to
trade. These variables are highly correlated with each other, as there are only 118 countries
in the dataset. Hence, I instead run separate regressions on different groups of countries
depending on income levels and the other variables.
Estimating the model in first-differences simplifies the framework by eliminating country
specific and short-run time invariant effects (e.g., gradual changes in sector specific technol-
ogy, climate conditions due to global warming, or industrial composition of the country).
Note that this estimation framework resembles the calibration exercise shown in Table 2,
which examined manufacturing output growth rates across countries in response to a de-
crease in agricultural productivity. The above equation also includes lagged yield growth in
order to allow for a time lag between an agricultural shock and its impact on manufacturing
– for example, in the northern-hemisphere where the harvest occurs in the fall, the effect
of the shock on manufacturing may exist in the following year data. Similarly, agricultural
seasonality can affect estimation results significantly. I address this issue by grouping coun-
tries depending on the latitude, and show that consideration of seasonality is indeed very
important for the results.
For robustness checks, I use other variables to ensure that the estimation results are
driven by the theoretical mechanisms. Note that the theory also predicts that higher open-
ness to trade weakens income effects (see section 6) and that larger shares of agricultural
production out of total GDP strengthen the model prediction. I examine these using data
on international trade and agricultural output. Meanwhile, recall that this paper introduced
relatively simple models that do not incorporate some features that may be important to
other studies. For example, if a country has a well-developed financial system, the effect
of agricultural shocks on resource reallocations may decline because each sector can hedge
against economic shocks by savings and borrowings. Hence, I additionally test how the level
of financial development affects the extent to which agricultural shocks impact manufactur-
ing output.
Importantly, input-output linkages can be a concern for testing the proposed theory in
aggregate level analysis. To avoid the direct impact of agricultural shocks on manufacturing,
I exclude manufacturing sectors that use agricultural products as primary inputs (such as
food, tobacco, or cotton). Admittedly, such effects still remain, which can be quantified
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using a simple model from Jones (2011) and OECD input-out data across countries.19 I find
that the direct input-output linkage effect induces a 10% increase in agricultural productiv-
ity to generate about a 0.3% increase in manufacturing output excluding food, tobacco, and
textile-related sectors, in less developed countries with per capita GDP less than $10,000
(in 2005 international dollars). When all manufacturing sectors are combined, the effect
substantially increases to 1.4%, which shows that excluding such sectors controls for the
input-output linkage effect reasonably well. I will leave further analysis of the 0.3% increase
as future work for the following reasons. One, estimation results in section 5.3 will show
that the 0.3% input-output linkage effect is less than one-tenth of the estimate effect. Two,
input-output data differ greatly across countries and even within developing countries, but
the data are available only for a subset of developing countries.
Channels — The theory suggests the two-step channels through which agricultural
productivity affects manufacturing output: productivity shocks affect food prices, and then
some labor and capital resources reallocate between the two sectors. Using crop price data
and manufacturing data on employment and capital investment, I test the channels using
similar frameworks:
∆CropPricec,t = αc + αt + β0 + β1 ·∆yieldc,t + β2 ·∆yieldc,t−1 + c,t , (11)
∆Lmc,t = αc + αt + β0 + β1 ·∆yieldc,t + β2 ·∆yieldc,t−1 + c,t , (12)
∆Kmc,t = αc + αt + β0 + β1 ·∆yieldc,t + β2 ·∆yieldc,t−1 + c,t . (13)
These specifications are also tested on different groups of countries with varying income lev-
els, latitudes, openness to trade, shares of agriculture, and credit constraints.
Endogeneity and first-stage estimation — An important concern in estimating Equation
(10) is that factors outside the model may affect both yields and industrial output, leading to
a biased estimate effect. Consider two examples. First, suppose there is common technologi-
cal progress that raises productivity in all sectors of the economy. This will generate positive
correlation between yields and industrial output independent of the theoretical mechanism,
leading to an upward bias in OLS results. Second, yields (output per unit of land) are used
as a measure of agricultural productivity because they are consistently available for many
countries and time periods. However, yields differ from the pure TFP measure, because they
also depend on inputs. Since agriculture and manufacturing compete for the limited amount
of resources in the economy, changes in policies that favor one sector over another will induce
negative correlation between yields and manufacturing output. For example, when a gov-
ernment decides to subsidize agriculture, this may pull resources out of manufacturing and
into agriculture, reducing manufacturing output and raising crop yields at the same time.
This will cause a downward bias in the OLS results.
The solution for this issue is to find the source of exogenous variation in agricultural
19Using the model from Jones (2011), it can be shown log(∆y) = (I − B′)−1log(∆Z), where ∆y is a
vector of real output changes in each sector; (I − B′)−1 is the Leontief inverse matrix; ∆Z is a vector of
TFP changes across sectors (only agricultural productivity changes from 1 to 1.1).
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TFP. Detailed studies of agricultural production show that yields are sensitive to changes in
rainfall and temperature (e.g., Lobell et al., 2007; Schlenker et al., 2009). I use only rainfall
shocks, as some studies show that heat can affect manufacturing workers’ productivity and
institutions that influence productivity growth, especially in poor countries (Dell et al., 2012;
Jones and Olken, 2010; Colmer, 2016; Chen, 2003).20
In order to ensure that rainfall affects manufacturing output by affecting yields and not
through other channels, I perform several robustness checks. First, I find that the labor
movement effect in response to agricultural productivity is stronger and highly significant in
countries with agricultural seasonality. Plus, I find that labor productivity in manufacturing
hardly changes in response to rainfall. Second, results using rainfall applied to non-crop ar-
eas exhibit weaker effects (note that non-crop area rainfall is still correlated with crop-area
rainfall, although the effect on yield is weaker). These results greatly weaken the possible
operation of other non-agricultural channels.
The first-stage relationship between yield and rainfall is as follows:
∆yieldc,t = ηc + ηt + γ0 + γ1 ·∆rainc,t + γ2 ·∆rainc,t−1 +Xc,t + uc,t , (14)
where Xc,t = tropic·∆rainc,t+tropic·∆rainc,t−1; ∆rainc,t = ln rainc,trainc,t−1 ; ηc and ηt are country
and year fixed effects, respectively; and uc,t is an idiosyncratic error term. I include interac-
tion terms with a tropical region dummy, which is equal to 1 if the country has a tropical
climate, since the rainfall effect on yield can be much smaller in such climate. Lastly, I
include both rainfall growth rates at time t and t− 1 to instrument for the two endogenous
regressors, ∆yieldc,t and ∆yieldc,t−1, in the main estimating equation (10).
4.2 Data
Manufacturing Data — Manufacturing data on annual output in value added, the num-
ber of employees, and gross fixed capital formation come from the 2011 UNIDO Industrial
Statistics Database. I use the INDSTAT2 version, which reports the data according to the
two-digit ISIC Revision 3 classification, for the period 1970-2002.21 Although the original
UNIDO dataset contains 23 sectors, I aggregate the sectors into 8 categories for two reasons.
First, many countries (especially, low-income countries) report values that are aggregated
from multiple sectors (for example, some countries combine metals and machinery together
and report the data as metals). Second, sectors with similar characteristics are grouped
into the same category to study sector-specific effects of agricultural productivity on man-
ufacturing. The list of sectors is displayed in the Appendix Table A.2. Sector 1 (food and
20Jayachandran (2006) also uses crop yield as a proxy for agricultural TFP and rainfall shocks to instru-
ment crop yields in order to study changes in agricultural wages in response to productivity shocks. Miguel
et al. (2004) uses rainfall growth to instrument income growth in African countries and study the effect of
economic conditions on the likelihood of civil conflicts. Dercon (2004) uses panel data from rural Ethiopia
and rainfall shocks in order to study consumption growth.
21The results are also robust to using longer time-series 1961-2008 (see Appendix Tables A.7-10). Esti-
mating 50 years of time series data across countries might be too extensive due to the rapidly changing world
economic situation. Also, it is reasonable to consider the period before the onset of the unprecedented food
crisis in 2007-8.
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tobacco) and sector 2 (textile related industries that use cotton intensively) are excluded in
aggregate-level regressions to avoid the direct impact of agricultural productivity on man-
ufacturing output through agricultural inputs. After dropping countries with fewer than 5
consecutive year observations (in the number of employees, as this has fewer missing values
than output and investment) and combining these data with other data, I have 118 countries
in the analysis.
The first three rows in Table 5 show some statistics on the aggregated manufacturing data
excluding the two sectors. For each country, I first calculate mean and standard deviations
of yearly growth rates in manufacturing output, employment, and capital investment. I then
report mean values of the calculated cross-country values in different income groups. First,
it can be seen that output, employment, and capital investment grew about 6%, 3%, and
25% annually on average during the period 1970-2002 (see column 1 in Table 5). Second,
volatilities are about twice higher for employment and output in poor countries (mean GDP
per capita less than $4,000), compared to higher-income countries (mean GDP per capita
greater than $10,000).
Precipitation Data — Precipitation data come from the CRU-TS v3.10.01 (1901-
2009) Monthly Historic Climate Database released by the University of East Anglia. The
dataset reports worldwide monthly precipitation at 0.5×0.5 degree resolution (approximately
56km×56km at the equator). The crop distribution data is taken from Agricultural Lands in
2000, Ramankutty et al. (2008). This dataset contains the distribution of global agricultural
lands in the year 2000 at 5-minute resolution in latitude by longitude (approximately 7km
× 7km at the equator). I aggregate these data to match the precipitation data at 0.5 ×
0.5 degree resolution. In this dataset, each data point is assigned to a value ranging from
zero to one, where the value is zero if there are no crops growing in the area and is one if
the area is full of crops. Next, I construct another data layer that contains relative areas of
all the grid cells on the globe using triple integrals in spherical coordinates, with the grid
cell areas at the equator (approximately 56km×56km) equal to 1. Note that grid cell areas
are smaller at higher latitudes. Lastly, another data layer that contains the world country
border information is taken from the Thematic Mapping world borders dataset. This does
not include small countries that do not fully contain any single grid cell (0.5×0.5 degree
resolution), so all such small countries are naturally dropped from the analysis.
With these datasets, I use the GIS software to construct three types of annual rainfall
data: crop-area weighted rainfall, non-crop area rainfall, and area weighted rainfall. First,
crop-area weighted rainfall is the precipitation level weighted by crop density multiplied
by the area of each grid cell within the country. That is, CropRainc,t =
∑
i∈cRaini,c,t ·
Ci,cAi,c∑
i∈c Ci,cAi,c
, where Raini,c,t is the sum of raw precipitation levels in the grid cell i in country
c over 12 months in year t; Ci,c is the crop density in the grid cell i in country c; Ai,c is the area
of a grid cell i in country c. This captures the amount of rainfall that is relevant to agricultural
lands in each country (for example, in the Amazon precipitation levels are high, although no
crops are growing in the region). Second, non-crop area rainfall is constructed by aggregating
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the precipitation data over the grid cells where the crop density is less than 10%, weighted
again by grid cell areas in a country. That is, NonCropRainc,t =
∑
i∈cRaini,c,t · Ii,cAi,c∑
i∈c Ii,cAi,c
,
where Ii,c indicates one if the crop density Ci,c is less than 10% and zero otherwise. Third, I
construct area weighted rainfall data by simply weighting precipitation by the grid cell area,
ARc,t =
∑
i∈cRaini,c,t · Ai,c∑
i∈c Ai,c
. I mainly use the crop-area weighted rainfall as instrument,
and the other two are used for robustness checks.
Agricultural and other Economic Data — Cereal yield, the weight (kilograms) of crops
produced per unit (hectare) of harvested land, is used as a measure of agricultural produc-
tivity. The data comes from the FAOSTAT and includes major staple crops such as wheat,
rice, maize, barley, oats, rye, and millet. Crop price data on wheat, maize, rice, soybean,
barley, and sorghum are also taken from the FAOSTAT. I use annual producer prices for the
1991-2008 period, which are provided by farmers through annual questionnaires. Since con-
sumer prices are available only from the year 2000, I use producer prices instead, assuming
that producer prices directly affect consumer prices.
Row 4 in Table 5 shows cross-country average values of within-country mean and volatil-
ities of rainfall growth rates (crop-area weighted). It can be seen that the level of rainfall
volatility, which corresponds to the size of exogenous productivity shocks from a particular
source, is similar in poor and rich countries at about 23%. On the other hand, volatility of
yield (see row 5) is significantly higher in poor countries (GDP per capita less than $4,000) at
about 26%, compared to the 16% yield volatility in higher-income countries (GDP per capita
greater than $10,000). One plausible explanation is that yield response to rainfall shocks
is higher in poor countries (this is first-stage result, which will be shown in the following
subsection) due to poor irrigation systems. There can be many other reasons other than
rainfall, such as higher sensitivity to temperature and larger shocks to intermediate inputs
in developing countries. Accordingly, rows 6-8 of Table 5 show that the crop prices tend to
be highly volatile in poor countries.
Next, as a measure for openness to trade, I construct values of export shares in manufac-
turing output (aggregated over the sectors that do not use agricultural products as primary
inputs) across countries, using the trade data from COMTRADE . The following two datasets
are taken from the World Bank database: the share of agricultural value added as a share
of GDP, and aggregate private credit provided by banks and other financial institutions as
a share of GDP. Consistent with Levine et al. (2000), the private credit data is used as a
measure of financial development. The two datasets are used to see whether the strength of
theoretical predictions varies depending on those conditions. Lastly, PPP converted GDP
per capita at 2005 constant prices and exchange rates to USD are taken from the Penn World
Table 7.1.
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5 Estimation Results
5.1 Crop Yield and Rainfall (first-stage results)
Table 6 presents the first-stage relationship between crop yield and the crop-area-weighted
rainfall. I find that an increase in current year rainfall tends to raise yields of the same year
in less developed countries, with t-statistics larger than 7 for all specifications. For exam-
ple, a 10% increase in rainfall leads to a 2.8% increase in yield in countries with per capita
GDP less than $10,000 (column 3). To consider the differing effects of rainfall in tropical
and non-tropical climates, I include a tropical region dummy (which takes 1 if the country
has a tropical climate and zero otherwise) interacted with the rainfall growth. I find that
a tropical climate reduces the positive effect of rainfall on yield by more than 70% in all
specifications that contain a reasonable number of tropical climate countries (columns 2 -
5), and the results are highly significant.
When I restrict the sample with per capita income below $4,000, the positive relationship
between current year rainfall and yield become even stronger: a 10% increase in rainfall leads
to a 3.4% increase in yield (column 2 of Table 6). The effect further increases to 4.2% in
Sub-Saharan African countries (column 1). On the other hand, in higher income countries
with per capita income greater than $10,000, the effect decreases by more than 70% (column
6). This implies that the effect of rainfall on yields tends to decrease with the level of eco-
nomic development, which might be attributable to better irrigation systems in developed
countries. Finally, note that the first-stage F -statistics in columns 1-5 are all greater than
20, implying that the crop-area-weighted rainfall is a strong instrument for yields in less
developed countries.
5.2 Main Estimation Results
Agricultural productivity and manufacturing output — The theory implies that the
income effect causes the positive relationship between agricultural productivity and man-
ufacturing output, which is stronger when income levels are close to the subsistence level.
Accordingly, Table 7 explores the second-stage relationship between yields (in log growth
rates) and aggregate manufacturing output (in log growth rates; the aggregate output ex-
cludes the sectors that use agricultural products as primary inputs). I re-estimate the first
stage for each specification across different dimensions, and report new F -statistics. Column
1 of Table 7 reports the OLS result for countries with per capita income less than $10,000
(in 2005 international dollars). The estimate of the lagged yield growth coefficient, which
is the elasticity of manufacturing output with respect to yield, is 0.08. Meanwhile, the IV
estimate (column 2 of Table 7) for the same coefficient is 0.19. Both results indicate the
positive link between agricultural productivity and manufacturing output, which is consis-
tent with Implication 2. However, the magnitude of the OLS result is much smaller than
the magnitude of the IV result. As discussed in section 4.1, the fact that manufacturing and
agriculture compete for the limited amount of resources in a country can result in a negative
correlation between yield and manufacturing output. This makes yields endogenous, leading
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to the downward bias of the OLS result.
An important thing to note about the Table 7 results is that only the coefficients of lagged
yield growth are significantly positive, while the current yield growth registers insignificantly.
As mentioned in section 4.1, a plausible reason for this may relate to agricultural seasonality
– especially for countries in the northern hemisphere – and a time lag between an agricul-
tural shock and its impact on manufacturing. Indeed, column 5 shows that the lagged yield
coefficient becomes more significant and larger when the sample is restricted to the north-
ern hemisphere countries with minimum latitude at 20 degrees, which implies that a 10%
decrease in yield leads to a 2.6% decrease in manufacturing output. On the other hand, the
result is not significant for the sample countries near the equator (with latitudes between -20
and 20 degrees). This is in line with the theory, as agricultural workers have low incentive to
move to and from manufacturing if the harvest occurs all year round. The relevant results
on employment are shown in the next subsection.
The core theoretical prediction of this paper is that the income effect is stronger when
the income level is close to the subsistence level. So far, I have shown that the estimation
results are consistent with the theory for countries with per capita income less than $10,000.
When I further restrict the sample to countries with per capita income less than $4,000, the
lagged yield growth coefficient increases to 0.24 (column 8 of Table 7) from 0.18 (column
3) and is statistically significant. On the other hand, consistent with the theory, column 9
shows that the estimate becomes insignificant for higher-income countries (per capita income
greater than $10,000).
I next examine how other variables such as the share of financial development, openness
to trade, and agricultural GDP shares affect the strength of the model’s predictions (Table
8).22 First, I find that credit constraints have a strong impact on the result. Because the
model assumes no saving and borrowing, the only way to compensate for an adverse shock
to agriculture – in the presence of subsistence requirements – is to move resources away from
manufacturing and into agriculture. Thus, if one can show that the effect of agricultural
productivity on manufacturing is larger in countries with poor credit systems, the key argu-
ment of the theory is strengthened. Indeed, when the sample is further restricted by private
credit less than 30% of GDP – this is quite low considering that 80% is the average level
for developing countries – the IV result on the lagged yield growth jumps to 0.29 from 0.18
with 1% statistical significance (column 2 of Table 8, compared with the column 1 baseline
result). Note that the average per capita GDP of this sample with poor credit system is
$4,287 (column 2 of Table 8), which is much higher than $2,063, the average income of the
sample with the $4,000 maximum income cutoff (column 8 of Table 7). Even if the average
income is higher, the estimated elasticity, 0.29 shown in column 2 of Table 8 is greater than
22A better way to test this might be to include those variables interacted with yield growth in the
estimating equation. However, they are highly correlated with one another, along with per capita income
levels, and they all significantly affect the extent to which agricultural shocks impact manufacturing. Given
that the number of countries in the sample is only 118 with fewer than 2000 observations in total, including
all those relevant measures in the estimation leads to multicollinearity.
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the elasticity, 0.24, shown in column 8 of Table 7. This implies that the fluctuations of out-
put in response to agricultural productivity shocks can be higher despite the higher income
levels, if the countries suffer from poor financial systems.
Second, an important implication associated with the open economy model (see section
6) is that the strength of the positive link will decrease with the trade openness. To in-
vestigate this, I restrict the sample to countries with low trade openness (the export share
in manufacturing output less than 20%), and I find that the lagged yield growth coefficient
becomes even larger, 0.31 (column 3 of Table 8). In contrast, the positive link becomes in-
significant when the countries are relatively more open to trade (export shares greater than
20%; this result is not shown). Both results strongly support the theoretical prediction.
Third, the theory implies that the role of agricultural productivity will be stronger when the
share of agriculture is large. Consistently, column 4 of Table 8 points to a larger estimate
of the lagged yield growth coefficient when the sample is further restricted by agricultural
production shares greater than 10% of total GDP (compared with the column 1 baseline
result).
For further robustness checks, I construct non-crop area rainfall data by aggregating the
precipitation data over the grid cells where the crop density is less than 10%. I then use this
as an instrument with the same first-stage specification as before. Columns 5-7 of Table 8
show that the second-stage results using the non-crop area rainfall become less significant,
even if non-crop area rainfall tends to be highly correlated with crop-area rainfall within a
country. This weakens the possibility of other channels than the one proposed by this paper.
Predicted industrial output volatility — Finally, I investigate the contributions of rain-
fall shocks to yields on industrial output fluctuations. Table A.3 reports standard deviations
of predicted manufacturing output growth rates obtained from the following IV estimation
result for the Northern-hemisphere countries with average per capita GDP less than $10,000:
∆̂qmc,t = α̂c + β̂0 + β̂1 · ̂∆yieldc,t−1.
This specification is almost the same as the regression (3) in Table 7 except that this does
not include current-year yield growth (as the estimate is not significant) and the exchange
rate (as I want to calculate volatility caused only by yield fluctuations).
Using the above equation, I present two types of predicted volatility. First, I report stan-
dard deviations of ∆̂qmc,t when the projections of rainfall onto yields are used for ̂∆yieldc,t−1
(column 1 of Table A.3). The average value of such volatilities for the 38 sample countries
is about 5.4%. Second, column 2 of Table A.3 displays volatilities when the endogenous
variable, the yield data, is directly used instead of ̂∆yieldc,t−1, and the average volatility
is about 7.1%. The manufacturing output volatilities calculated directly from the UNIDO
data are also presented in column 3, where the average value is about 22.8%.
Next, I divide the two predicted volatilities by the real volatility, obtaining average values
of 0.31 and 0.44, respectively (see columns 4-5 of Table A.3). This implies that the crop
yield variations induced by rainfall shocks can explain about 31% of manufacturing output
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fluctuations in developing countries. Note that there are other important factors that affect
agricultural production, such as temperature and access to intermediate inputs. With the
strong assumption that all the variations in the yield data are not correlated with shocks to
manufacturing, about 44% of manufacturing output volatility on average can be explained
by the yield variations in the developing countries.
5.3 Evidence of Labor and Capital Reallocations
Importantly, the theoretical model suggests that agricultural productivity affects manu-
facturing output through the resource reallocation channel. When there is a negative shock
to agricultural productivity, a drought for example, labor and capital resources move toward
agriculture and out of manufacturing in response to an increase in food prices. This subsec-
tion presents strong evidence for the mechanism, which is in line with the main estimation
results discussed above. I investigate changes in manufacturing employment and capital in-
vestment in response to exogenous shocks to agricultural productivity.
Labor movement between sectors — The labor reallocation channel is highly important
in this analysis, as developing countries are labor abundant and most industries are labor
intensive. Hence, worker movement between the sectors can have a substantial impact on
output. To test the labor reallocation effect, agricultural seasonality needs to be taken into
consideration because labor movement is limited by many factors such as time, space, and
willingness to migrate. To illustrate, an agricultural worker in a northern-hemisphere coun-
try has a higher incentive to move to other sectors after the harvest in the fall, because there
is not much work to do during the winter and probably until the next harvest season.23
Table 9 reports estimation results of Equation (12). For the specifications that are in
line with the theory (columns 2-5 and 7-8), all the estimated coefficients on the current year
yield growth are highly significant at the 1% level, with the relatively consistent range of
the magnitudes between 0.22 and 0.35. The OLS and IV estimates shown in columns 1 and
2 of Table 9 are 0.04 and 0.22, respectively, for the less developed countries in the Northern
Hemisphere (income less than $10,000, with the 10-degrees minimum latitude cutoff). This
pattern, the much smaller OLS estimate than the IV one, was observed in the previous
results associated with output in Table 7. The competition for limited resources between
manufacturing and agriculture may have caused the downward bias of the OLS result. Put
differently, higher employment in manufacturing can be linked to lower yield due to lower
labor input, which causes a negative correlation between the two variables.
The IV result in column 5 of Table 9 implies that a 10% decrease in current year yield
leads to a 2.5% decrease in manufacturing employment in the same year, for the less de-
veloped countries (per capita income less than $10,000) located above 20-degrees latitude.
23Postel-Vinay (1994) discusses mobile temporary workers in eighteenth century France as follows: “...ev-
ery summer thousands of industrial workers left their jobs to work in the grain fields. ... wheat production
expanded most in districts where industrial workers were temporarily available for harvest work.” Given the
existence of mobile temporary workers in the eighteenth century, it might be reasonable to expect a similar
situation in developing countries today.
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When the minimum latitude cut is lowered to 10 degrees in the Northern Hemisphere, the
effect slightly decreases to 2.2% (column 2 of Table 9). Moreover, for countries that are
located closer to the equator (between -20 and 20 degree latitudes), the results become in-
significant (column 6 of Table 9), which is consistent with the previous results on output. A
plausible reason is that agricultural workers in this region may have low incentive to move
to other sectors as the harvest takes place all year round.24 These results associated with
agricultural seasonality strongly support the key mechanism of the theory that a decrease
in agricultural productivity reallocates labor out of manufacturing into agriculture to meet
the subsistence requirement.
In addition, I find two interesting results associated with credit constraints and strong
income effects. First, column 4 of Table 9 shows that when the sample is restricted to coun-
tries with relatively underdeveloped credit systems (private credit less than 30% of GDP),
the elasticity increases by more than 30%, from 0.22 to 0.29, with a significantly increased
t-statistic from 3.5 to 5.5 (compared with the baseline result in column 2 of Table 9). This
result is consistent with the implication of the theoretical mechanisms as well as the previous
estimation result for output with the same credit constraint (column 2 of Table 8). When
borrowing/lending is not available, pulling workers out of manufacturing and into agriculture
can help meet the subsistence requirement under a drought. Second, when the maximum
income cutoff is lowered to $4,000, the labor reallocation effect for the northern hemisphere
countries increases by more than 30% (columns 7-8 of Table 9). A plausible explanation for
this phenomenon is that workers are more willing to move across sectors to find a job when
their income levels are near the subsistence level. On the other hand, this effect disappears
for countries with a per capita income greater than $10,000. These results are consistent
with the main theoretical implication that the role of agriculture in resource reallocation
diminishes with income levels.
Note that unlike the previous results associated with output shown in Tables 7-8, it is the
coefficient on the current year yield growth that is significantly positive, while the coefficient
for the lagged one is close to zero. To understand this, assume that there were initially 10
workers in manufacturing. Suppose that there is a positive shock to yield in year t, and one
worker moved from agriculture to manufacturing after the harvest in the same year t and
continued to work in manufacturing until the next year, t+ 1, before the next harvest. Now,
the number of employees in manufacturing is 11 both at t and t+1, while it is still 10 at time
t − 1. Thus, log employment growth is log(11/10) > 0 at time t while it is log(11/11) = 0
at time t + 1. This example explains why the coefficient on current year yield growth is
significantly positive, while the coefficient on the lagged one is close to zero. The bottom
line is that the agricultural workers in the Northern Hemisphere move to manufacturing after
the harvest and before the new calendar year starts, which leads to the significantly positive
24It is possible that the resource reallocation effect still exists in countries near the equator. Another
reason for the insignificant estimation result might be that the agricultural seasonality near the equator may
not be well aligned with the annual calendar data (for example, it is probable that rainfall from previous
year June to next year March affects crop yields that are mostly harvested in May).
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estimates for the coefficient on the current year yield growth (and the close-to-zero estimates
for the lagged one).
Table 10 displays sector-specific regression results (total eight sectors, see Table A.2 for
the description) in developing countries, with the same estimation structure as the specifica-
tion 7 of Table 9. Interestingly, the wood product industries, which are highly labor-intensive,
exhibit a highly significant effect: a 10% decrease in agricultural productivity results in a
5.5% decrease in the number of employees, which is statistically significant at the 1% level.
On the other hand, highly capital-intensive industries such as chemicals, electrical machinery,
and motor vehicles register insignificantly. A plausible explanation is that capital-intensive
industries have an incentive to keep their workers, because costly capital assets need to be
operated continuously to cover the cost. Meanwhile, the employment in textiles registers
insignificantly despite its labor intensiveness, possibly due to the high share of exports.
Capital investment allocations — Table 11 displays the results of estimating Equation
(13), which explores the relationship between crop yield and capital investment in manufac-
turing. The IV result in column 2 implies that a 1% decrease in crop yield in year t leads
to about 1.7% decrease in capital investment in manufacturing in developing countries (per
capita income less than $10,000) in both years t and t + 1. Comparing with the column 1
result shows the downward bias of the OLS result. This pattern is consistent with the pre-
vious results on output and employment. These results support the theoretical mechanism
that some capital reallocates out of manufacturing in response to a decrease in agricultural
productivity.25 Admittedly, I do not directly observe capital stock moving into agriculture.
However, if we consider new capital investments that are available in the economy each year,
a decrease in investment in manufacturing can be interpreted as more investments in agricul-
ture (assuming that new capital investments are independent of agricultural productivity).26
When the sample is further restricted to the ones that are relatively closed to trade (the
export share in manufacturing output less than 20%), the effect becomes larger. On the
other hand, I find that the positive link becomes insignificant when the country is relatively
more open to trade or when the level of income is higher (per capita income greater than
$15,000), which is consistent with the theory.
Table 12 shows sector-specific regression results. I find that capital investments in capital-
intensive sectors (industries related to electrical machinery, basic metals and equipment) are
highly responsive to changes in agricultural productivity in developing countries. Meanwhile,
the wood-products industry (sector 3), which is labor intensive, registers insignificantly. Re-
call that in Table 10 the effect on employment was large and highly significant for the wood-
products industry, while other capital-intensive industries registered insignificantly. This
25It will be ideal if one can show with data that more resources reallocate toward agriculture in response
to an exogenous decrease in yield. However, agricultural data on resources does not have enough accuracy
to track year-to-year changes as the majority of agricultural land is managed by individuals or families in
developing countries.
26Another plausible channel that is not implied by the theory is that the total amount of new invest-
ments decreases after an adverse shock to agricultural productivity, which will also reduce investment in
manufacturing.
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flipping of results implies that the factor intensity of manufacturing sectors may determine
what type of factors move more intensively in response to agricultural productivity shocks,
which strengthens the robustness of the results in support of the theoretical mechanism.
5.4 Robustness
Estimations with Longer Lags — So far, all the estimating equations have included
only the current year and the previous year crop yield growth rates instrumented by rainfall.
There are two important reasons for this. First, rainfall at a longer lag does not significantly
affect the outcome variables. As will be shown in this section, the effect of rainfall shocks
on manufacturing does not persist more than two years. Although a harsh drought may
affect manufacturing for a longer period of time, various econometric estimations do not
seem to capture these cases. Second, growth rates over time are serially correlated, as the
denominator of a growth rate in year t is exactly the same as the numerator of the rate in
year t − 1. In particular, such correlations are even more problematic for rainfall growth
rates, as one of two years of drought are likely to be followed by more rainfall the next
year, for example. Therefore, including unnecessary lags of rainfall growth may distort the
estimates of the coefficients that truly matter.
In this section, I include longer lags of rainfall shocks in several different forms, and see
how many years the impact of such shocks persists. Tables 13-18 present estimation results
when the log growth rates of manufacturing employment and output are regressed on up to
10 lags of rainfall shocks in three different forms: drought dummies, log levels of rainfall, and
crop yields instrumented by rainfall (in log growth rates). All the estimations are performed
on the sample restricted to the less developed countries in the Northern Hemisphere (per
capita income less than $10,000 and 10-degrees minimum latitude cutoff).
Table 13 shows how rainfall shortages directly affect manufacturing employment over
time. The estimating equation is the following:
∆Lmc,t = αc + αt + β + Σ
10
j=0βj · droughtc,t−j + c,t , (15)
where droughtc,t−j is a dummy variable which takes 1 if the precipitation of the country
c in the year t − j is less than 90% of the average precipitation over time in the country;
∆Lmc,t = ln
Lmc,t
Lmc,t−1
; αc is a country fixed effect; αt is a time-fixed effect; c,t is an idiosyncratic
error term. Table 13 presents the estimation results, with the four varying sample restric-
tions which are in line with the ones in Table 9. Comparing the results of columns 1-4 of
Table 13 reveals that the coefficients on the current year t drought dummy are all negative
and highly significant. These are consistent with the main results in Table 9 which show
that a decrease in the current year yield induced by rainfall shortages leads to a reduction
in manufacturing employment.
Meanwhile, the coefficients on the 1-year-lagged drought dummy are all positive, the
opposite sign, and the t-statistics vary from 2.30 to 1.55 (row 2 of Table 13). Note that the
rainfall shortage in year t− 1 can affect the manufacturing employment growth rate in year
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t, ln
Lmc,t
Lmc,t−1
, in two opposite directions: (i) reducing the denominator Lmc,t−1, as the rainfall
shortage reduces the manufacturing employment in the same year, thus increasing ln
Lmc,t
Lmc,t−1
;
(ii) reducing the numerator Lmc,t, if the rainfall shortage effect persists longer, thus decreasing
ln
Lmc,t
Lmc,t−1
. Therefore, the positive signs of the estimates imply that the rainfall shortage in the
year t−1 predominantly reduced the same year employment Lmc,t−1 rather than the following
year employment. Now, the question is, for how many years does a rainfall shortage affect
employment in manufacturing? Observing the nine remaining coefficients on the drought
dummies from t − 2 to t − 10 for the four specifications in Table 13, we notice that 35 out
of 36 estimates are not statistically significant with magnitudes near zero. This implies that
the effect of rainfall shortages on labor movement does not persist more than two years.
For poorer and more credit constrained countries (columns 2-3 of Table 13), a rainfall
shortage (having less than 90% of average precipitation) in the current year t reduces the
manufacturing employment growth by about 4%, while a rainfall shortage in the previous
year t− 1 leads to about 7% increase of the growth rate. Similar results hold for the specifi-
cation with no further restriction (column 1) and for the higher latitude countries (column
4), with each magnitude of the effects decreased by about 2 percentage points. The bottom
line is that the larger estimates for the poorer and more credit constrained countries are
consistent with the main results in Table 9.
Next, to generate results in Table 14, I replace the drought dummies with log precipi-
tation levels in the above Equation (15). For each of the four sample restrictions, I report
both results with 3 lags and 10 lags. For a fair comparison, I drop the initial 10 years of
observations to equalize the number of observations. The pattern of results is similar to the
Table 13 results described above: (i) rainfall shortages in the current (previous) year lead to
a reduction (an increase) in manufacturing employment; (ii) the coefficients for the lagged
rainfall from t− 2 to t− 10 are not statistically significant and are mostly close to zero; and
(iii) the estimates are larger for poorer and more credit constrained countries. In addition,
the estimates with 10 lags are somewhat smaller than the ones with 3 lags (first row of Table
14). If we believe the estimation results that the rainfall shocks occurred more than 4 years
in advance have no statistically significant effects, the discrepancies between the results of
the two specifications with 3 lags and 10 lags may be attributable to the correlation among
the lagged rainfall variables themselves. For example, rainfall shortages for one or two years
are likely to be followed by more rainfall the next year.
Such serial correlations across the lags are even more problematic when the estimations
involve long lags of growth rates in rainfall, as the denominator of a growth rate in year t
is equal to the numerator of the rate in year t− 1. Not surprisingly, the original estimation
results (Table 9) become highly distorted when I include 10 lags of the yield growth rates
instrumented by rainfall growth. However, Table 15 shows that the results are fairly robust
to the inclusion of up to 3 lags.
So far, I have investigated the results of the three variants of the empirical framework
associated with employment. Now, I repeat the same robustness checks for manufacturing
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output specifications. Table 16 shows the output results with the 10 lags of the drought
dummies. Recall that the dependent variable is the manufacturing output growth rate in
year t, ln
qmc,t
qmc,t−1
. The drought dummies can affect the growth rate by affecting qmc,t, q
m
c,t−1, or
both. First, the coefficients on the drought dummy in year t − 2 are significant and have
positive signs. Similar results hold for the coefficients of the t − 3 drought dummy. This
implies that the rainfall shortages in years t− 2 and t− 3 decrease the output in year t− 1,
thus raising the year t output growth rate. Put differently, there exists up to two years
of time lag between rainfall shocks and manufacturing production. Second, the coefficients
on the drought dummies from t − 4 to t − 10 are mostly close to zero and statistically not
significant, implying that the effect of rainfall shortages does not persist for more than two
years (as the rainfall shock in t− 4 has no effect on output in t− 1). Third, the coefficients
on the current year t drought dummy are all negative, and these are statistically significant
for low-income countries, countries that are relatively closed to trade, and the ones with
large agricultural production shares (columns 2-4 of Table 16). Note that the only way for
the current year drought to decrease the current year output growth rate is by reducing the
current year output qmc,t. Lastly, the coefficients on the drought dummy in year t− 1 are all
negative, although not statistically significant. A plausible reason is that the rainfall short-
age in year t− 1 could have affected both qmc,t and qmc,t−1, with more weight on the following
calendar year output, qmc,t.
Similarly, Table 17 shows that the coefficients on the log precipitation levels in year t− 2
are negative and statistically significant. More rainfall in year t − 2 raises output in t − 1,
thus decreasing the output growth rate in year t. On the other hand, more rainfall in year
t − 1 may increase output both in year t − 1 and in the year t, leading to the statistically
not significant estimates for the year t− 1 coefficient. Meanwhile, unlike the results in Table
16, the coefficients on the log precipitation in year t − 3 are not significant. It seems that
the drought dummy is able to capture more persistent effects on output than the continuous
precipitation level variable. Finally, in Table 18, I turn to the original main estimations on
output and include up to three lags of yield growth rates instrumented by rainfall growth.
The results are reasonably robust to the previous results displayed in Tables 7 and 8. As
mentioned above, some discrepancies across the results with the differing number of lags are
likely to be caused by the strong correlations among the lags of the rainfall and yield growth
rates.
Poor Countries’ Data Quality — There exist concerns about the quality of rainfall
and crop yield data in poor countries. First, Dell, Jones, and Olken (2012) show that their
estimations of the weather effect on economic growth using a number of different weather
datasets lead to similar results. They also find that there is no relationship between a coun-
try’s economic conditions and the number of weather stations actually reporting the weather
in a given year. Second, there is a particular concern that some poor countries may directly
use rainfall data to produce crop yield data. If this is the case, one can expect that the
elasticity of crop yield with respect to rainfall for low-income countries will be close to one
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or a value that is very different from the elasticity for higher income countries. However,
column 1 of Table 6 shows that such elasticity is 0.42 for the Sub-Saharan African countries,
compared to 0.20 for the less developed countries (GDP per capita less than $10,000) exclud-
ing Sub-Saharan Africa (column 4 of Table 6). Given the dry weather and poor irrigation
systems in many Sub-Saharan African countries, such difference between the two elasticities
seems reasonable. In addition, the elasticity is 0.25 for the less developed countries with
minimum latitude 10 degrees in the Northern Hemisphere, which automatically excludes
many Sub-Saharan African countries (column 5 of Table 6). Furthermore, the corresponding
t-statistics of the three estimates are not much different from one another at around 7.
Third, I test whether the main estimation results on the relationship between yield and
manufacturing output are robust to the exclusion of low quality data. Columns 4 and 6 of
Table 7 show the IV results with the $2,000 minimum income cutoff and the exclusion of
the Sub-Saharan African countries, respectively. Both of the estimates of the lagged yield
growth coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level, with the correct sign and sim-
ilar magnitudes as other estimates of the various specifications reported in Tables 7 and 8.27
Moreover, I find that the employment result (the effect of yield on employment in manufac-
turing, discussed in section 5.3) is also robust to the exclusion of the Sub-Saharan African
countries (column 3 of Table 9) and the exclusion of countries with per capita income less
than $2,000.
5.5 Crop Prices and International Trade in Agriculture
Domestic productivity shocks and domestic crop prices — Recall that the price chan-
nel links between agricultural productivity shocks and resource reallocations: a negative
shock to agricultural productivity causes food prices to go up, and resources move toward
agriculture. The negative link between productivity and food prices is stronger when the
economy is relatively closed to agricultural trade. Indeed, there is a large literature show-
ing limited international price transmission to domestic food markets due to various trade
barriers in agriculture (e.g., Anderson and Nelgen, 2012; Atkin, 2012; Gollin and Rogerson,
2014). Accordingly, the econometric estimation results in Table A.4 confirms that negative
shocks to productivity tend to raise crop prices. For instance, I find that a 10% decrease
in yield induced by rainfall shortages leads to roughly an 8% increase in wheat and barley
prices.28 Both results are highly significant at the 1% level. Results for maize, sorghum,
and soybean prices also display consistent results at the 5% level of significance. In sum,
27Column 3 of Table 7 shows that the IV estimation result of the elasticity of manufacturing output with
respect to crop yield is 0.18, when the sample is restricted to less developed countries with the 10-degree
minimum latitude in the Northern Hemisphere. When the sample is further restricted with the $2,000
minimum income cutoff, the elasticity increases to 0.24 (column 4 of Table 7). This may be because the
poorest countries tend to be located close to the Equator, where agricultural workers have low incentive
to move to other sectors as the harvest takes place all year round. Similarly, the column 6 result can be
compared to column 2 of Table 7 which excludes the Sub-Saharan African countries.
28Yields in the estimations in Table A.4 are not crop specific and include all major staple crops as described
in 4.2. This is for the purpose of allowing substitution effects. For example, when overall yields of major
staple crops fall, the price of maize can rise due to the substitution effect even if maize yield did not change.
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these results suggest that short-run fluctuations in crop prices are significantly affected by
domestic productivity shocks.
Brief remarks on international trade in agriculture — Although agricultural trade is
an important factor, it has not been taken into consideration in the data analysis so far. I
instead have used trade data only in manufacturing as a measure for openness to trade for
its simplicity. Note that agricultural imports and exports may affect the model predictions
differently. For example, in countries with large shares of agricultural imports, the domes-
tic food prices will heavily depend on international prices, thus weakening the positive link
between yields and manufacturing output. On the other hand, for countries with intensive
agricultural exports, an increase in agricultural productivity raises total income (due to an
increase in agriculture exports), which can cause manufacturing output to rise due to positive
income effects (thus, strengthening the positive link). Although I find some empirical evi-
dence that supports these predictions, it is difficult to clearly identify the role of agricultural
imports and exports separately. This is simply because countries engage in both importing
and exporting agricultural goods, and governments impose barriers to agricultural trade –
possibly depending on domestic productivity or international food price shocks – in order
to protect domestic markets. Thus, I instead present open economy models in the following
section, and theoretically show that higher openness to trade weakens the income effect and
helps resources reallocate toward relatively more productive sectors.
6 Open Economy
As discussed above, the key in applying the baseline model to the real world is whether
domestic agricultural productivity shocks affect domestic prices, or are absorbed through
changes in trade volumes. To further investigate this, I extend the baseline model and
present two versions of open-economy models. First, using a two-country model, I show
that the link between agricultural productivity and manufacturing output in home country
changes sign from positive to negative as the size of foreign country increases. Second, us-
ing a model that allows imperfect pass-through of international food prices to the domestic
market, I show that the effect of domestic productivity shocks is attenuated and matches the
magnitude that was found in the previous econometric estimation (recall that the elasticity
of manufacturing output with respect to agricultural productivity implied by the baseline
model was more than twice higher).
6.1 Two-Country Model
Assume a world economy consisting of two countries of the baseline model type, indexed
by c = H,F . The two countries are identical except for population and agricultural produc-
tivity. They produce homogenous manufacturing and agricultural goods, and engage in free
trade with no transportation costs. In country c there exists Lc population, each endowed
with one unit of labor and Kc
Lc
units of capital. In this subsection, we focus on how the home
country’s equilibrium allocations are affected by domestic agricultural productivity shocks,
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while varying the size of the foreign country.
On the demand side, each agent in both countries has the following Stone-Geary prefer-
ence:
u = (qa − γa)αq1−αm , 0 < α < 1.
Accordingly, the aggregate preference for country c with total population Lc is:
Uc = Lc · (qa − γa)αq1−αm = (Lcqa − Lcγa)α(Lcqm)1−α.
Rewriting Lcqa and Lcqm as qa,c and qm,c, we have
Uc = (qa,c − Lcγa)αq1−αm,c , c = H,F.
Given the aggregate preferences, we can solve the utility maximization problems for each
country as if there were one representative agent.
The production side has the same setting as described in section 2. Labor and capital
are perfectly mobile between the two sectors within a country, but not across the countries.
Since goods are freely traded with zero transport costs, there will be one relative equilib-
rium price pa across countries. The competitive equilibrium of the open economy model is
a set of allocations {La,c, Lm,c, Ka,c, Km,c, qa,c, qm,c} and prices {pa, wc, rc}, such that, given
prices, (1) {qa,c, qm,c} solve the utility maximization problem of the representative agent,
(2) {La,c, Lm,c, Ka,c, Km,c} solve the profit maximization problem of each sector, and (3) all
markets clear internationally (i.e., for each sector, the sum of produced quantity in the world
equals the sum of demand in the world).
Quantitative analysis — Given the equilibrium solutions (see Appendix A.3 for the
derivation), the key question is, how does the model prediction for the home country change
as the size of the foreign country varies? To address this question, I simulate the model
and investigate how an agricultural shock in the home country affects resource reallocations
differently depending on the size of the foreign country. For simplicity, we assume there is a
constant C that satisfies LF = C · LH and KF = C ·KH . Thus, C indicates the factor by
which the foreign country is bigger than the home country.
The same calibrated parameters are applied for purpose of comparison (see Table 1), and,
initially, both countries are identical in all aspects except the population.29 Table A.5 shows
changes in equilibrium allocations when the home country is subject to a 15% decrease in
agricultural productivity. The first two columns of the table show that for C = 0.01, 0.20, and
0.25 agricultural employment has positive growth, whereas manufacturing employment has
negative growth. The dominating income effect leads to the perverse phenomenon in which
resources are moving toward a sector with declining productivity. However, the strength of
the positive link between agricultural productivity and manufacturing output weakens as
the foreign country size increases, and eventually the link changes sign. The last three rows
29Both home and foreign countries are set as Ethiopia where capital stock, agricultural productivity, and
manufacturing productivity are all equal to 1.
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show that resources flow in the opposite direction: for C = 0.30, 0.35, and 0.50, some labor
moves out of agriculture and into manufacturing, which results in increases in manufacturing
output.
What affects the sign and the strength of the link between agricultural productivity and
manufacturing? There are two competing effects in this model: (1) the income effect, which
causes a positive link and (2) the comparative advantage effect, which causes a negative
link. The income effect is strongest under the closed economy. In contrast, the comparative
advantage effect is strongest under the small open economy, as is explained in the following
subsection.
Comparative advantage effects under the small open economy — The comparative ad-
vantage effect can be easily identified algebraically under the small open economy rather
than in the two-country model. Thus, imagine a small open economy where world prices
of the goods are fixed. Since these prices are fixed, the demand system has no effect on
production, so the resource allocations and manufacturing output will be solely determined
by the supply side. Appendix A.3 derives a closed form solution for Lm under the small open
economy assumption with fixed world prices pa = pw as follows:
Lm = (
zm
za
· λ3
pw
)
1
βm−βa · K
βm − βa −
βa(1− βm)
βm − βa · L , (16)
where λ3 =
βm
βa
[βm(1− βa)]βm−1[βa(1− βm)]1−βa . Note that Lm is positively correlated with
relative productivity zm
za
. When agricultural productivity za decreases, the manufacturing
sector becomes relatively more productive, so some labor and capital resources move toward
manufacturing and out of agriculture for profits (thus, a negative link between agricultural
productivity and manufacturing output).
6.2 Imperfect Pass-through Model
The model in this section is motivated by the literature on agricultural trade that stud-
ies the imperfect pass-through of international food prices to domestic food prices. For
example, Anderson and Nelgen (2012) show that the unweighted average of the short run
elasticity of international price transmission to domestic markets (for rice, wheat, and maize)
is 0.52.30 In other words, a 1% increase in international prices leads to only a 0.52% – not
1% – increase in domestic prices.31 Note that this phenomenon is closely associated with
the fact that the share of traded goods in agriculture is low. For example, less than 8% of
rice production and less than 20% of wheat production are traded in the world according
to USDA (2012). There might be several reasons for this: (1) biased consumer preferences
30They use a partial-adjustment geometric distributed lag formulation to estimate elasticities for each
key product for 75 countries for the period 1985-2004. The short run price elasticity is for changes within a
year, while the long run elasticity is for changes over three to five years.
31This finding is consistent with the literature showing that the domestic supply shock is the main
contributing factor for short run food price fluctuations, while long run fluctuations are primarily attributed
to international prices or exchange rates (Loening et al., 2009; Burgess et al., 2011; Anderson and Nelgen,
2012).
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for locally abundant foods (Atkin, 2012), (2) high transportation costs, as food is bulky
and heavy (Tombe, 2015; Gollin and Rogerson, 2014; Caselli, Chen, Gollin, 2012), and (3)
governments imposing barriers to agricultural trade in order to protect domestic markets
from international price variability (e.g., Anderson and Nelgen, 2012; Gouel, 2012; Martin
and Anderson, 2012). In other words, in the real world with costly trade, a combination
of low agricultural trade volumes and explicit protection of domestic agricultural markets
leads to imperfect pass-through of international prices. Hence, domestic supply and demand
still play a crucial role in determining equilibrium prices and output. Accordingly, while the
direction of the baseline model (closed economy) results might still hold, the magnitudes of
the effects will be attenuated in the presence of international markets.
In the two-country model, the domestic productivity shock was ‘fully’ translated into a
combination of the two competing effects: an income effect and a comparative advantage
effect. This section introduces a model in which domestic agricultural productivity has only
a ‘partial’ impact. The primary difference in the model setting compared to the two-country
model is that foreign foods enter the model as imperfect substitutes for home foods, which
is associated with the above explanation by Atkin (2012). This allows fitting the model to
the empirical observation on the imperfect pass-through of international food prices.
In this section, I assume a small open economy that imports foods and exports manu-
factures. Although this assumption is for algebraic simplicity, it can be somewhat justified
given the fact that 111 out of 136 developing countries were net food importers during 2005 -
2009 (FAOSTAT).32 In addition, I assume homogenous manufacturing products whose prices
are normalized to one, while agricultural goods are differentiated depending on the country
of origin. Also, I assume that agricultural goods from the world can be inelastically supplied
to the home country at the fixed world price pa,w. Lastly, I assume balanced trade in which
the value of agricultural imports equals that of manufacturing exports.
A representative agent has a preference represented by Cobb-Douglas Stone-Geary upper-
tier utility and CES lower-tier utility,
U = ([q
σ−1
σ
a + q
σ−1
σ
a,w ]
σ
σ−1 − γa)αq1−αm , (17)
where qa,w denotes agricultural goods that are produced in the world, and qa and qm are
domestically produced agricultural and manufacturing goods. Given the prices, the agent
maximizes the utility subject to the budget constraint I = wL + rK = paqa + pa,wqa,w +
qm. The demand functions for manufacturing, domestic agricultural goods, and agricultural
imports from the world are the following:
qm = (1− α) · (I − paγa), (18)
qa =
p−σa
p1−σa + p1−σa,w
· [α(I − paγa) + paγa], (19)
32If domestic food can be exported, then the world demand for the domestic food will affect the domestic
price. This requires a two-country model, which will only complicate the model without producing much
information, since most developing countries are small open economies and net food importers.
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qimpa,w =
p−σa,w
p1−σa + p1−σa,w
· [α(I − paγa) + paγa], (20)
where pa = (p
1−σ
a + p
1−σ
a,w )
1/(1−σ), which is the domestic agricultural price index.
The supply side takes the same Cobb-Dougals technology setting as the previous models.
The balanced trade condition implies that pa,wq
imp
a,w = q
exp
m . In addition, the market clearing
condition implies that
zmK
βm
m L
1−βm
m = qm + pa,wq
imp
a,w︸ ︷︷ ︸
qexpm
. (21)
Using first-order conditions derived from the production side, I can express pa, Km, w, and
r in terms of Lm and other parameters. Using this and by plugging Equations (18) and (20)
into Equation (21), I obtain an implicit solution for Lm.
There are two competing effects in this model in response to a decrease in domestic agri-
cultural productivity (thus an increase in the domestic agricultural price). First, since the
foreign agricultural goods are only imperfect substitutes for domestic products, the domestic
food price index pa = (p
1−σ
a + p
1−σ
a,w )
1/(1−σ) will still increase, thus reducing the disposable
income I−paγa. However, the magnitude of the price increase will be smaller than the price
increase in the baseline model. This leads to an income effect whose magnitude is smaller
compared to the baseline model. Second, due to the increase in the domestic food price,
some consumers substitute away from domestic foods for more foreign foods. Therefore, on
the production side, more resources will be allocated toward manufacturing because of the
decreasing demand in domestic agricultural goods. Among the two competing effects, the
following calibration result shows that the income effect still dominates, but the strength of
the link is much weaker compared to the baseline model.
While all other parameters are set at the previously calibrated values shown in Table 1, σ
is newly calibrated based on the estimation result by Anderson and Nelgen (2012), who show
that the un-weighted average of the short run elasticity of international price transmission
to domestic markets (for rice, wheat, and maize) is 0.52. I calibrate σ in such a way that
a 1% increase in the world price pa,w leads to a 0.52% increase in the equilibrium domestic
price index pa = (p
1−σ
a + p
1−σ
a,w )
1/(1−σ). This gives σ ≈ 5. For simple comparison, I fix the
world price pa,w at the equilibrium price of the baseline model, and za,c takes the average
value of crop yields in country c.
Given the parameter values, I re-simulate this model and investigate changes in manufac-
turing output in response to a 15% decrease in domestic agricultural productivity. Column 5
of Table 4 shows that magnitudes of growth rates are much smaller than the baseline model
results in column 1 – for example, in Ghana this model generates a 4.8% decrease in output,
whereas the baseline model generates a 17.2% decrease. This leads to a much closer match
to the econometric estimation result in the previous section, which predicts about a 4.4%
decrease in output (in response to the -15% productivity shock) for developing countries
(column 2 in Table 8).
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7 Concluding Remarks
This paper identified a novel mechanism by which agricultural productivity shocks affect
industrial output through general equilibrium linkages. In the baseline model, adverse shocks
to agricultural productivity require that increased labor and capital resources be devoted to
agriculture to meet the subsistence requirement. As resources available to manufacturing fall,
so does manufacturing output. Both the calibration exercise and econometric estimations
show that the strength of the positive link between agricultural productivity and manufac-
turing output decreases with income level, and that the degree of output fluctuations also
decreases with income level.
These findings have important implications for development and international trade.
First, this paper shows that adverse shocks to agriculture add considerable uncertainty to
manufacturing sectors in developing countries, a feature which may push investors away and
dampen economic growth. Second, the subsistence requirement feature leads to a coun-
terintuitive situation: resources flow toward the sector with declining productivity. I have
demonstrated that this may worsen aggregate productivity in developing countries. Fortu-
nately, the open economy models suggest a clear solution that international trade, especially
in agriculture, can help mitigate the impact of agricultural shocks on developing economies.
As an example, under the small open economy, resources can move to any sector that has
become relatively more productive even in the presence of subsistence consumption. Thus,
an economic loss caused by a decrease in agricultural productivity is not only limited to
agriculture but also partly offset by producing more manufactures.
The implication for international food trade is relevant in light of recent developments.
First, researchers have shown that climate change will increase temperature and the fre-
quency and severity of droughts. Unfortunately, developing countries will suffer the most, as
many of them are located near the Equator where further increases in temperature can sig-
nificantly lower agricultural productivity (e.g., Lobell and Field, 2007; Burgess, Deschenes,
Donaldson, and Greenstone, 2013). Second, after the 2007-2008 world food crisis (during
which, for example, international prices for rice increased by 160% within a year), countries
have tried to insulate domestic markets from international price variability by restricting food
exports and relying on self-sufficiency. This paper suggests that such policies are likely to
increase output fluctuations in poor countries and sheds light on the importance of reestab-
lishing a reliable world market for food.
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Figures and Tables 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Calibration of Parameter Values 
Parameter Value Comments Data source 
𝑲𝒄 [1, 90.8] 
Per capita capital stock of each country 
normalized by Ethiopia’s 
Investment data, Penn World 
Table 7.1 
𝑳 1 Normalization  
𝜷𝒎 0.58 
Capital income share in manufacturing 
(Cobb-Douglas production parameter) 
GTAP Input-Output table  
(India 2007) 
𝜷𝒂 0.32 
Capital income share in agriculture 
(Cobb-Douglas production parameter) 
GTAP Input-Output table  
(India 2007) 
𝒛𝒎,𝒄 [1, 5.12] 
Free parameter which is set to match 
each country’s income excluding service 
sectors  
World Bank (2004) 
𝒛𝒂,𝒄
𝒕  [1, 7.64] 
Yearly crop yields of each country 
normalized by Ethiopia’s minimum yield 
FAO (1970 – 2002) 
𝜶 0.0178 Utility weight parameter 
 
Used the equilibrium solution 
equation (9) and employment 
shares in manufacturing in the 
U.S. = 0.91 and in Ethiopia = 
0.07 (WB, 2004))  
𝜸𝒂 0.8910 Utility subsistence parameter 
Notes: Values in brackets represent ranges of country or time specific parameters (𝑐 denotes a country, 𝑡 
denotes a year). Ethiopia serves as a base country, as it is one of the poorest countries in the manufacturing 
data provided by UNIDO (2011).  
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Table 2 Changes in Manufacturing Output 
(A 15% decrease in agricultural productivity) 
Notes: * indicates that it is an equilibrium outcome from the simulation of the baseline model. 𝑧𝑎,𝑐 denotes 
the average value of cereal yields over the period 1970-2002 in a country 𝑐, normalized by Ethiopia’s.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 
𝐾 𝑧𝑎,𝑐 
𝑝𝑎
∗ 𝛾𝑎
𝐼∗
 𝐿𝑚
∗   za  decreases by 15% 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
%∆pa
∗  
(5) 
%∆Lm
∗  
(6) 
%∆Km
∗  
(7) 
%∆qm
∗  
(8) 
Ethiopia 1.00 1.00 0.89 0.07  + 22.4% - 58.0% - 51.1% - 54.2% 
Malawi 2.14 1.19 0.57 0.31  + 20.6% - 21.9% - 13.0% - 16.4% 
Ghana 3.00 1.04 0.58 0.30  + 20.6% - 21.8% - 13.8% - 17.2% 
Bangladesh 2.84 2.36 0.25 0.63  + 18.9% - 6.9% - 3.1% - 4.7% 
India 6.17 1.73 0.27 0.61  + 19.0% - 7.4% - 3.4% - 5.1% 
Portugal 60.76 1.77 0.12 0.79  + 18.2% - 3.1% - 1.2% - 2.0% 
United States 90.84 4.59 0.04 0.91  + 17.8% - 1.0% - 0.4% - 0.6% 
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Table 3 Simulated Volatility 
Country 
(Data) 
Crop yield 
volatility 
(1) 
Simulated 
manuf. output 
volatility  
(2) 
(Data) 
Manuf. output 
volatility 
(3) 
Ethiopia 12.9% 40.7% 18.9% 
Malawi 45.8% 65.1% 16.5% 
Ghana 19.5% 79.1% 45.2% 
Bangladesh 5.6% 2.6% 25.8% 
India 6.4% 3.3% 10.5% 
Portugal 16.6% 2.8% 14.7% 
United States 13.6% 0.6% 5.0% 
Notes: The simulated volatility values (column 2) of the baseline model are based on the annual yield data from 
the FAO (see Table 1). Values in columns 1 and 3 are computed directly from the data. Volatility in percentage 
terms can be understood simply as the standard deviation of percentage changes in output. 
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Table 4 Model Extensions 
Country 
 %∆qm
∗   (za decreases by 15%) 
 
Baseline model 
(σ = 1) 
(1) 
CES model Imperfect pass-
through model 
(5) 
σ = 0.52 
(2) 
σ = 0.85 
(3) 
σ = 2.5 
(4) 
Ethiopia 
 
- 54.162% -54.653% -54.207% - 54.161% - 11.808% 
Malawi 
 
- 16.429% -17.121% -16.5% -16.427% - 4.664% 
Ghana 
 
- 17.235% -18.441% -17.32% - 17.234% - 4.834% 
Bangladesh  - 4.73% -5.378% -4.802% - 4.727% - 1.499% 
India 
 
- 5.145% -6.051% -5.225% - 5.144% - 1.622% 
Portugal 
 
- 2.032% -3.46% -2.125% - 2.032% - .665% 
United States  - .627% -1.711% -0.711% - .626% - .209% 
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Table 5 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean of cross-country values 
 
 
 
 
Observations 
(all countries) 
 
All countries 
GDP per 
capita 
< 4000 
GDP per 
capita 
> 10000 
 
Mean 
Stand. 
Dev. 
Stand. Dev. 
/ (*) = Mean 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Manufacturing :      
1. Growth of output (value added) 1.06 .20 .25 .14 2,047 
2. Growth of number of employees 1.03 .12 .16 .07 2,344 
3. Growth of gross capital formation 1.25 .66 .98 .25 1,449 
Agriculture :      
4. Growth of crop-area rainfall  1.03 .22 .23 .23 3,776 
5. Growth of cereal yield 1.05 .22 .26 .16 3,391 
6. Growth of wheat price 1.09 .40 .69 .23 1,110 
7. Growth of maize price 1.13 .38 .31 .23 1,287 
8. Growth of rice price 1.14 .45 .41 .21 969 
9. Share of agriculture (% of GDP) 19.7 4.0 31.0* 5.5* 2,977 
Other variables:      
10. Growth of GDP per capita 1.02 .06    .07 .04 3,379 
11. Growth of exchange rate to $US 2.88 7.20 12.54 .27 3,447 
12. Export share in manufacturing output  .37 .23 .40* .24* 2,217 
13. Private credit (% of GDP) 32 9.6 18* 64* 2,590 
 Notes: The data above have country-year observations. Columns 1-4 report mean of cross country average 
values. Column 3 is for countries with per capita GDP less than $4,000 (in 2005 international dollars), and 
column 4 is for higher income countries. The sample refers to the years 1970-2002, except the crop prices 
which refer to 1991-2008 due to limited availability.   
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Table 6 Rainfall and Crop Yield (First-stage results) 
 
  
Dependent variable: Crop yield, t (in log growth rates) 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa only 
 
 GDP per 
capita  
< $4,000 
 GDP per capita < $10,000  
GDP per 
capita > 
$10,000 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
Excluded 
(4) 
Northern 
hemisphere 
 
(5)  (6) 
LogRainfallGrowth, t 
.42*** 
[7.63] 
 
.34*** 
[10.74] 
 
.28*** 
[11.25] 
.20*** 
[7.48] 
.25*** 
[7.75] 
 
.07** 
[2.46] 
TropicalRegion  ×  
LogRainfallGrowth,t  
-.56 
[-1.36] 
 
-.36*** 
[-4.62] 
 
-.25*** 
[-4.74] 
-.16*** 
[-3.16] 
-.18** 
[-2.09] 
 
-.33 
[-1.41] 
LogRainfallGrowth,t-1 
-.01 
[-.24] 
 
.01 
[.24] 
 
.01 
[.27] 
-.01 
[-.25] 
-.01 
[-.42] 
 
.06** 
[2.16] 
TropicalRegion  ×   
LogRainfallGrowth,t-1  
-.07 
[-.15] 
 
-.04 
[-.53] 
 
.00 
[.01] 
.03 
[.56] 
.00 
[.03] 
 
-.03 
[-.12] 
R-squared .19  .13  .10 .08 .11  .10 
F-statistics 23.77  38.98  44.43 22.61 25.94  1.73 
Observations 764  1,609  2400 1,636 1,259  852 
Notes: T-statistics are in brackets. Each observation is a country-year. ‘Northern hemisphere’ represents the 
countries with latitude greater than 10. Each regression includes country and year fixed effects.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 7 Manufacturing Output and Crop Yield (instrumented with rainfall) 
 
Dependent variable: Manufacturing output, t (in log growth) 
GDP per capita  <  $10,000  
GDP per 
capita  <  
$4,000 
 
GDP per 
capita  >  
$10,000 
 all 
Northern  hemisphere 
Northern 
hemisphere* 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Excluded 
Equator  
Northern 
hemisphere 
 
Northern 
hemisphere all 
GDP per 
capita  > 
$2,000 
 
OLS 
(1) 
IV 
(2) 
IV 
(3) 
IV 
(4) 
IV 
(5) 
IV 
(6) 
IV 
(7) 
 
IV 
(8) 
 
IV 
(9) 
Log yield 
growth, t-1 
.08**  
[2.37] 
.19**  
[2.05] 
.18**  
[2.33] 
.24**  
[2.17] 
.26**  
[2.24] 
.29**  
[2.10] 
.20 
[1.20] 
 
.24**  
[2.43] 
 
.39  
[.15] 
Log yield 
growth, t 
.08*  
[1.83] 
-.00 
[.13] 
.02  
[.13] 
.28 
[1.41] 
.15 
[.65] 
.10 
[.35] 
-.16 
[-.61] 
 
.05 
[.24] 
 
-.35 
[-.23] 
Log exchange 
rate growth, t 
-.16*** 
[-3.53] 
-.16*** 
[-3.76] 
-.20* 
[-1.75] 
-.26*** 
[-3.40] 
-.13 
[-1.12] 
-.11*** 
[-3.37] 
-.20*** 
[-3.20] 
 
-.14 
[-.65] 
 
-.72*** 
[-5.97] 
R-squared .17 .15 .19 .26 .20 .17 .15  .19  -- 
F-statistics 
(first-stage) 
-- 33.59 25.55 15.71 31.05 23.36 23.76  16.50  2.65 
Average GDP 
per capita 
$3,708 $3,708 $4,006 $5,018 $4,216 $4,486 $2,950  $2,063  $22,053 
Observations 1,264 1,264 627 464 448 928 691  356  626 
Notes: T-statistics are in brackets. Each observation is a country-year. ‘Northern hemisphere (Northern 
hemisphere*)’ represents the countries with latitude greater than 10 (20). ‘Equator’ represents the countries whose 
latitude is between -20 and 20. Each regression includes country and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are 
clustered by country. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 8 Manufacturing Output and Crop Yield, Robustness  
Notes: T-statistics are in brackets. Each observation is a country-year. The sample is restricted to the Northern hemisphere countries 
whose latitude is greater than 10, and GDP per capita less than $10,000.  ‘Agricultural’ represents observations with shares of 
agriculture production out of GDP greater than 10%. ‘Low trade’ represents observations with export shares in manufacturing 
output less than 20%.  ‘Low credit’ represents observations with private credit (% of total GDP) less than 30%. For regressions (6)-
(8), non-crop area weighted rainfall is used as instrument. Each regression includes country and year fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors are clustered by country. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
 Dependent variable: Manufacturing output, t (in log growth) 
 
GDP per capita  <  $10,000 
Northern hemisphere countries 
 Using crop-area weighted rainfall as instrument  
Using non-crop area  
rainfall as instrument 
 
baseline low credit low trade agricultural  baseline low credit low trade 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
Log yield growth, t-1 
.18**  
[2.33] 
.29***  
[3.02] 
.31** 
[2.15] 
.25**  
[2.33] 
 
.20*  
[1.66] 
.27**  
[2.29] 
.26  
[1.37] 
Log yield 
growth, t 
.02  
[.13] 
.11  
[.72] 
.13  
[.53] 
.04 
[.26] 
 
-.05  
[-.31] 
-.02  
[-.14] 
.06  
[.35] 
Log exchange rate 
growth, t 
-.20* 
[-1.75] 
-.32*** 
[-3.42] 
-.40*** 
[-3.13] 
-.36*** 
[-3.44] 
 
-.19* 
[-1.66] 
-.32*** 
[-3.39] 
-.41*** 
[-3.26] 
R-squared .19 .22 .27 .26  .15 .19 .27 
F-statistics  
(first-stage) 
25.55 38.23 12.65 22.77  17.17 37.86 12.21 
average GDP per capita $4,006 $4,287 $3,472 $3,532  $3,898 $3,412 $3,453 
Observations 627 380 376 447  593 346 367 
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Table 9 Employment in Manufacturing and Crop Yield  
 Dependent variable: Employment in Manufacturing, t (in log growth rates) 
 GDP per capita  < $10,000  
GDP per capita 
< $4,000 
 
GDP per 
capita 
> $10,000 
 Northern hemisphere 
Northern 
hemisphere* 
Equator  
Northern 
hemisphere 
Northern 
hemisphere* 
 
Northern 
hemisphere 
 
OLS 
(1) 
baseline 
 
IV 
(2) 
Sub- 
Saharan 
Africa 
Excluded 
(3) 
low 
credit 
(4) 
IV 
(5) 
IV 
(6)  
IV 
(7) 
IV 
(8)  
IV 
(9) 
Log yield 
growth, t 
.04** 
[2.02] 
.22*** 
[3.51] 
.24*** 
[3.30] 
.29*** 
[5.49] 
.25*** 
[3.19] 
-.10 
[-.97] 
 
.29*** 
[4.01] 
.35*** 
[2.70] 
 
.21 
[.16] 
Log yield 
growth, t-1 
.02 
[.75] 
-.03 
[-.35] 
.01 
[.07] 
-.02 
[-.12] 
.01 
[.07] 
.01 
[.17] 
 
.01 
[.06] 
.14 
[.79] 
 
.97 
[.63] 
Log exchange 
rate growth, t 
-.03* 
[-1.79] 
-.03* 
[-1.71] 
-.04* 
[-1.99] 
-.01 
[-.36] 
-.04* 
[-1.89] 
-.01 
[-.71] 
 
-.01 
[-.25] 
-.02 
[-.43] 
 
-.04 
[-.50] 
R-squared .16 .04 .04 .06 .01 .10  -- --  -- 
F-statistics 
(first-stage) 
-- 34.48 27.85 38.70 43.75 47.53  23.82 26.14  .52 
Observations 780 780 735 470 562 802  466 304  628 
Notes: T-statistics are in brackets. Each observation is a country-year. ‘Northern hemisphere (Northern 
hemisphere*)’ stands for the countries with latitude greater than 10 (20). ‘Equator’ stands for the countries whose 
latitude is between -20 and 20. ‘Low credit’ represents observations with private credit (% of total GDP) less than 
30%. Each regression includes country and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by country.  
 *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 10 Sector-level Employment in Manufacturing (instrumented with rainfall) 
 Dependent variable: Employment in Manufacturing, t (in log growth rates) 
 
Food 
 
(Sector 1) 
Textiles 
 
(Sector 2) 
Wood 
  
(Sector 3) 
Chemicals 
 
(Sector 4) 
Plastics 
 
(Sector 5) 
Basic Metals         
& Equipment 
 (Sector 6) 
Electrical 
Machinery 
(Sector 7) 
Motor 
Vehicles 
(Sector 8) 
 (1)    (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log yield 
growth, t 
.14* 
[1.79] 
.09 
[1.10] 
.55*** 
[3.42] 
.11 
[.80] 
.24** 
[2.57] 
.47*** 
[2.63] 
.01 
[.04] 
-.14 
[-.61] 
Log yield 
growth, t-1 
.16 
[1.23] 
-.09 
[-.60] 
-.09 
[-.61] 
-.05 
[-.35] 
.19 
[.99] 
.15 
[.70] 
-.13 
[-.95] 
.25 
[.64] 
Log exchange 
rate growth, t 
.04 
[1.31] 
.05 
[.88 
-.01 
[-.26] 
-.04 
[-.80] 
.02 
[.44] 
.01 
[.18] 
-.11 
[-1.64] 
.01 
[.20] 
R-squared .19 .10 -- .13 .07 .09 .25 .07 
Observations 466 466 466 461 461 448 417 383 
Notes: T-statistics are in brackets. Each observation is a country-year. The sample is restricted to the Northern 
hemisphere countries with GDP per capita less than $4,000. Each regression includes country and year fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors are clustered by country. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 11 Capital Investment in Manufacturing and Crop Yield (instrumented with rainfall) 
 Dependent variable: Capital investment in Manufacturing, t (in log growth rates) 
 GDP per capita  < $10,000  
GDP per capita 
< $4,000 
 
GDP per capita 
< $15,000 
GDP per capita 
> $15,000 
  
OLS 
(1) 
IV 
(2) 
low 
trade 
 
IV 
(3) 
 
IV 
(4)  
IV 
(5) 
IV 
(6) 
Log yield 
growth, t-1 
-.01 
[-.13] 
1.66** 
[2.33] 
1.56 
[1.40] 
 
1.86** 
[2.33] 
 
1.63** 
[2.24] 
1.01 
[.72] 
Log yield 
growth, t 
-.10 
[-.84] 
1.76* 
[1.79] 
5.35** 
[2.25] 
 
.56 
[.60] 
 
1.68 
[1.64] 
-.78 
[-1.26] 
Log exchange 
rate growth, t 
-.27*** 
[-3.62] 
-.23*** 
[-2.67] 
-.11 
[-.60] 
 
-.40*** 
[-2.67] 
 
-.22*** 
[-2.78] 
-.1.06*** 
[-5.70] 
F-statistics 
(first-stage) 
-- 10.93 3.36  6.03  11.64 .82 
Observations 763 763 386  400  865 513 
Notes: T-statistics are in brackets. Each observation is a country-year. ‘Low trade’ represents observations with 
export shares in manufacturing output less than 20%. Each regression includes country and year fixed effects.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 12 Sector-level Capital Investment in Manufacturing (instrumented with rainfall) 
 Dependent variable: Capital Investment in Manufacturing, t (in log growth rates) 
 
Food 
 
(Sector 1) 
Textiles 
 
(Sector 2) 
Wood 
  
(Sector 3) 
Chemicals 
 
(Sector 4) 
Plastics 
 
(Sector 5) 
Basic Metals         
& Equipment 
(Sector 6) 
Electrical 
Machinery 
(Sector 7) 
Motor 
Vehicles 
(Sector 8) 
 (1)    (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log yield 
growth, t-1 
.43 
[.74] 
.91 
[1.19] 
.21 
[.29] 
1.00 
[1.28] 
1.85 
[1.62] 
2.07* 
[1.92] 
.17 
[.22] 
2.00 
[1.25] 
Log yield 
growth, t 
.71 
[.84] 
1.35 
[1.23] 
.35 
[.35] 
.63 
[.56] 
3.76** 
[2.33] 
2.06 
[1.41] 
2.02** 
[1.99] 
3.80 
[1.26] 
Log exchange 
rate growth, t 
-.16** 
[-2.25] 
-.19** 
[-2.03] 
-.19** 
[-2.14] 
-.12 
[-1.31] 
-.31** 
[-2.23] 
-.08 
[-.67] 
-.19* 
[-1.66] 
-.09 
[-.61] 
Observations 758 751 764 741 737 753 660 641 
Notes: T-statistics are in brackets. Each observation is a country-year. The sample is restricted with GDP per capita 
less than $10,000. Each regression includes country and year fixed effects.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 13 Employment Results with 10 Lags of Drought Dummies 
  Dependent variable: Employment in Manufacturing, t (in log growth rates) 
  GDP per capita  < $10,000    &   Northern Hemisphere 
  
all 
 
(1) 
GDP per capita 
< $4,000  
 
(2) 
 
low credit 
 
(3) 
latitude > 20 
 
(4) 
Drought, t  
-.02*** 
[-2.74] 
-.04*** 
[-2.75] 
-.03** 
[-2.18] 
-.02** 
[-2.06] 
Drought, t-1  
.05** 
[2.05] 
.07** 
[2.30] 
.07* 
[1.84] 
.04 
[1.55] 
Drought, t-2  
-.00 
[-0.29] 
.00 
[0.07] 
.01 
[0.35] 
-.01 
[-0.55] 
Drought, t-3  
-.01 
[-0.68] 
-.02 
[-1.20] 
-.01 
[-0.78] 
-.00 
[-0.06] 
Drought, t-4  
.01 
[0.37] 
.01 
[0.23] 
.01 
[0.51] 
-.01 
[-0.47] 
Drought, t-5  
-.01 
[-0.72] 
-.03 
[-1.11] 
-.01 
[-0.49] 
-.01 
[-0.90] 
Drought, t-6  
-.00 
[-0.03] 
.01 
[0.42] 
.03 
[0.86] 
.01 
[0.29] 
Drought, t-7  
.02 
[1.15] 
.02 
[0.67] 
.03 
[1.15] 
.03 
[1.20] 
Drought, t-8  
.01 
[0.40] 
.04** 
[2.22] 
.01 
[0.61] 
.00 
[0.28] 
Drought, t-9  
.00 
[0.28] 
.01 
[0.31] 
.02 
[1.10] 
.01 
[0.59] 
Drought, t-10  
.00 
[0.05] 
-.01 
[-0.42] 
-.01 
[-0.22] 
.01 
[0.25] 
Log exchange 
rate growth, t 
 
.03* 
[-1.72] 
-.01 
[-0.38] 
-.02 
[-0.91] 
-.04** 
[-2.25] 
R-squared  .15 .18 .17 .15 
Observations  596 344 368 437 
Notes: T-statistics are in brackets. Each observation is a country-year. ‘Drought, t’ represents a dummy variable 
which takes 1 if the precipitation level at time t is lower than 90% of the average precipitation of the country. ‘Low 
credit’ represents observations with private credit (% of total GDP) less than 30%. ‘Northern hemisphere’ stands 
for the countries with latitude greater than 10. Each regression includes country and year fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors are clustered by country.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table 14 Employment Results with 10 Lags of Precipitation Levels 
 
 Dependent variable: Employment in Manufacturing, t (in log growth rates) 
 
 GDP per capita  < $10,000    &   Northern Hemisphere 
  all  
GDP per capita   
< $4,000 
 low credit  latitude > 20 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Log rainfall, t  
.09** 
[2.42] 
.08** 
[2.30] 
 
.13** 
[2.42] 
.11** 
[2.27] 
 
.18** 
[2.32] 
.16** 
[2.21] 
 
.10* 
[2.04] 
.08* 
[1.80] 
Log rainfall, t-1  
-.08 
[-1.23] 
-.07 
[-1.14] 
 
-.12 
[-1.41] 
-.11 
[-1.45] 
 
-.13 
[-1.07] 
-.14 
[-1.08] 
 
-.07 
[-0.95] 
-.06 
[-0.85] 
Log rainfall, t-2  
.02 
[0.60] 
.01 
[0.42] 
 
.02 
[0.48] 
.01 
[0.27] 
 
.04 
[0.55] 
.01 
[0.16] 
 
.03 
[0.97] 
-.02 
[0.70] 
Log rainfall, t-3  
.01 
[0.65] 
.01 
[0.37] 
 
.01 
[0.22] 
.01 
[0.27] 
 
.01 
[0.22] 
-.02 
[-0.26] 
 
-.00 
[-0.02] 
-.01 
[-0.18] 
Log rainfall, t-4   
.01 
[0.23] 
 
 
 
.02 
[0.65] 
 
 
 
-.04 
[-0.98] 
  
.02 
[0.79] 
Log rainfall, t-5   
.04 
[1.00] 
  
.07 
[1.26] 
  
.05 
[0.49] 
  
.04 
[1.17] 
Log rainfall, t-6   
-.04 
[-0.78] 
  
-.07 
[-1.00] 
  
-.12 
[-1.12] 
  
-.06 
[-0.72] 
Log rainfall, t-7   
-.09 
[-1.37] 
  
-.11 
[-1.17] 
  
-.14 
[-1.23] 
  
-.12 
[-1.34] 
Log rainfall, t-8   
.02 
[0.45] 
  
-.02 
[-0.48] 
  
.05 
[0.87] 
  
.02 
[0.30] 
Log rainfall, t-9   
-.01 
[-0.27] 
  
-.01 
[-0.20] 
  
-.10* 
[-1.97] 
  
-.03 
[-0.57] 
Log rainfall, t-10   
.01 
[0.36] 
  
.01 
[0.28] 
  
.02 
[0.38] 
  
.02 
[0.42] 
Log exchange 
rate growth, t 
 
-.03* 
[-1.75] 
-.03 
[-1.45] 
 
-.02 
[-0.46] 
-.01 
[-0.16] 
 
-.02 
[-0.74] 
-.01 
[-0.21] 
 
-.04** 
[-2.07] 
-.04* 
[-1.96] 
R-squared  0.14 0.16  0.16 0.18  0.7 0.21  0.15 0.17 
Observations  596 596  344 344  368 368  437 437 
Notes: T-statistics are in brackets. Each observation is a country-year. ‘Low credit’ represents observations with 
private credit (% of total GDP) less than 30%. ‘Northern hemisphere’ stands for the countries with latitude greater 
than 10. Each regression includes country and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by country. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table 15 Employment Results with Longer Lags of Log Crop Yield Growth (instrumented with rainfall) 
Notes: T-statistics are in brackets. Each observation is a country-year. ‘Low credit’ represents observations with private credit (% of total GDP) less than 30%. ‘Northern 
hemisphere’ stands for the countries with latitude greater than 10. Each regression includes country and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by 
country. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 Dependent variable: Employment in Manufacturing, t (in log growth rates) 
 GDP per capita  < $10,000    &   Northern Hemisphere 
 all  
GDP per capita   
< $4,000 
 low credit  latitude > 20 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12)  (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Log yield 
growth, t 
0.22*** 
[3.25] 
.22*** 
[3.51] 
.19** 
[2.33] 
.19* 
[1.85] 
 
.26*** 
[4.05] 
.29*** 
[4.01] 
.24*** 
[2.79] 
.25** 
[2.33] 
 
.31*** 
[4.40] 
.29*** 
[5.49] 
.28*** 
[3.79] 
.35*** 
[3.50] 
 
.26*** 
[2.93] 
.25*** 
[3.19] 
.23** 
[2.43] 
.28** 
[2.24] 
Log yield 
growth, t-1 
 
-.03 
[-0.35] 
-.04 
[-0.38] 
-.07 
[-0.64] 
  
.01 
[0.06] 
-.02 
[-0.15] 
-.08 
[-0.56] 
  
-.02 
[-0.12] 
.03 
[0.22] 
.05 
[0.32] 
  
0.01 
[0.07] 
.06 
[0.37] 
.03 
[0.22] 
Log yield 
growth, t-2 
  
-.02 
[-0.40] 
-.06 
[-0.81] 
   
-.06 
[-0.67] 
-.13 
[-0.99] 
   
.06 
[0.74] 
.06 
[0.61] 
   
.06 
[0.60] 
-.04 
[-0.26] 
Log yield 
growth, t-3 
   
-.02 
[-0.28] 
    
-0.5 
[-0.79] 
    
.11 
[1.49] 
    
-.07 
[-0.62] 
Log 
exchange rate 
growth, t 
-.03 
[-1.34] 
-.03* 
[-1.71] 
-.04* 
[-1.70] 
-.05** 
[-2.08] 
 
.00 
[0.03] 
-.01 
[-0.25] 
-.00 
[-0.07] 
-.01 
[-0.27] 
 
-.01 
[-0.32] 
-.01 
[-0.36] 
-.00 
[-0.09] 
-.02 
[-0.58] 
 
-.04** 
[-1.96] 
-.04* 
[-1.89] 
-.05** 
[-2.33] 
-.06*** 
[-3.17] 
R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.03  - - 0.02 -  0.06 0.06 0.08 0.05  0.00 0.01 0.05 - 
Observations 804 780 750 722  483 466 448 429  481 470 451 433  580 562 539 518 
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Table 16 Output Results with 10 Lags of Drought Dummies 
 
 
Dependent variable: Manufacturing output, t (in log growth rates) 
 
 
GDP per capita  < $10,000    &   Northern Hemisphere 
 
 
all 
 
(1) 
GDP per capita 
< $4,000  
 
(2) 
low trade 
 
(3) 
agricultural 
 
(4) 
latitude > 20 
 
(5) 
Drought, t 
 -.02 
[-0.66] 
-.05** 
[-2.27] 
-.06** 
[-2.06] 
-.06** 
[-1.99] 
-.03 
[-0.84] 
Drought, t-1 
 -.01 
[-0.47] 
-.02 
[-0.43] 
-.01 
[-0.31] 
-.01 
[-0.32] 
-.01 
[-0.43] 
Drought, t-2 
 
.04* 
[1.73] 
.09*** 
[3.29] 
.07* 
[1.86] 
.05* 
[1.95] 
.05** 
[2.05] 
Drought, t-3 
 .06* 
[2.03] 
.10*** 
[3.14] 
.04 
[1.27] 
.04 
[1.40] 
.06** 
[2.18] 
Drought, t-4 
 
-.00 
[-0.14] 
.03 
[0.71] 
.01 
[0.40] 
-.01 
[-0.44] 
.03 
[1.22] 
Drought, t-5 
 .02 
[0.63] 
-.00 
[-0.12] 
-.00 
[-0.08] 
.02 
[0.72] 
.02 
[0.89] 
Drought, t-6 
 
.04 
[1.45] 
.07 
[1.64] 
.06* 
[1.82] 
.04 
[1.23] 
.07 
[1.91] 
Drought, t-7 
 .02 
[0.86] 
-.04 
[-1.35] 
.04 
[1.53] 
.00 
[0.07] 
.03 
[1.02] 
Drought, t-8 
 -.00 
[-0.04] 
.00 
[0.09] 
.02 
[0.73] 
.03 
[1.61] 
.02 
[0.94] 
Drought, t-9 
 -.01 
[-0.33] 
-.01 
[-0.27] 
-.01 
[-0.24] 
-.01 
[-0.24] 
.01 
[0.35] 
Drought, t-10 
 .01 
[0.24] 
.04 
[0.90] 
-.01 
[-0.20] 
-.01 
[-0.31] 
.02 
[0.64] 
Log exchange 
rate growth, t 
 
-.17 
[-1.60] 
-.10 
[-0.52] 
-.35*** 
[-2.75] 
-.35*** 
[-3.66] 
-.12 
[-1.01] 
R-squared  0.23 0.32 0.36 0.30 0.24 
Observations  469 259 272 361 346 
Notes: T-statistics are in brackets. Each observation is a country-year. ‘Drought, t’ represents a dummy variable 
which takes 1 if the precipitation level at time t is lower than 90% of the average precipitation of the country.  ‘Low 
trade’ represents observations with export shares in manufacturing output less than 20%.  ‘Agricultural’ represents 
observations with shares of agriculture production out of GDP greater than 10%. ‘Northern hemisphere’ stands 
for the countries with latitude greater than 10. Each regression includes country and year fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors are clustered by country. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table 17 Output Results with 10 Lags of Precipitation Levels 
 
 Dependent variable: Manufacturing output, t (in log growth rates) 
 
 GDP per capita  < $10,000    &   Northern Hemisphere 
  all  
GDP per capita   
< $4,000 
 low trade  low credit 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Log rainfall, t  
-.04 
[-0.57] 
-.05 
[-0.60] 
 
-.04 
[-0.31] 
-.03 
[-0.22] 
 
.02 
[0.18] 
-.02 
[-0.21] 
 
-.04 
[-0.28] 
-.06 
[-0.41] 
Log rainfall, t-1  
-.03 
[-0.55] 
-.03 
[-0.73] 
 
-.02 
[-0.27] 
-.03 
[-0.38] 
 
-.05 
[-0.91] 
-.05 
[-0.75] 
 
-.02 
[-0.22] 
-.03 
[-0.35] 
Log rainfall, t-2  
-.13** 
[-2.24] 
-.14** 
[-2.33] 
 
-.18* 
[-1.95] 
-.19* 
[-1.86] 
 
-.21** 
[-2.51] 
-.24** 
[2.71] 
 
-.27* 
[-1.81] 
-.28* 
[-1.94] 
Log rainfall, t-3  
-.05 
[-0.79] 
-.04 
[-.59] 
 
-.02 
[-0.25] 
.00 
[0.00] 
 
-.15** 
[-2.08] 
-.11 
[-1.45] 
 
-.07 
[-0.96] 
-.09 
[-1.16] 
Log rainfall, t-4  
 
 
-0.01 
[-0.23] 
  
-.09 
[-0.93] 
  
-.07 
[-0.74] 
  
-.02 
[-0.23] 
Log rainfall, t-5   
0.01 
[0.18] 
  
.05 
[0.57] 
  
.11 
[0.99] 
  
0.12 
[1.10] 
Log rainfall, t-6   
-.04 
[-0.50] 
  
-.06 
[-.44] 
  
-.06 
[-0.51] 
  
-.19 
[-1.45] 
Log rainfall, t-7   
0.00 
[0.04] 
  
.05 
[0.59] 
  
-.07 
[-1.07] 
  
-.05 
[-0.55] 
Log rainfall, t-8   
-.04 
[-0.89] 
  
-.12* 
[-1.82] 
  
-.08 
[-0.67] 
  
-.07 
[-0.62] 
Log rainfall, t-9   
-.06 
[-0.76] 
  
0.00 
[0.02] 
  
.08 
[-0.79] 
  
-.14 
[-0.96] 
Log rainfall, t-10   
.01 
[0.26] 
  
.02 
[0.43] 
  
.05 
[0.61] 
  
.01 
[0.15] 
Log exchange 
rate growth, t 
 
-.18* 
[-1.49] 
-.18 
[-1.48] 
 
-.11 
[-0.48] 
-.11 
[-0.47] 
 
-.38*** 
[-2.78] 
-.37** 
[-2.52] 
 
-.30*** 
[-2.63] 
-.29** 
[-2.74] 
R-squared  0.22 0.23  0.29 0.26  0.36 0.37  0.23 0.25 
Observations  469 469  259 259  272 272  281 281 
Notes: T-statistics are in brackets. Each observation is a country-year. ‘Low trade’ represents observations with 
export shares in manufacturing output less than 20%. ‘Northern hemisphere’ stands for the countries with latitude 
greater than 10. Each regression includes country and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by 
country. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table 18 Output Results with Longer Lags of Log Crop Yield Growth (instrumented with rainfall) 
Notes: T-statistics are in brackets.  
Each observation is a country-year. ‘Low trade’ represents observations with export shares in manufacturing output less than 20%. ‘Northern hemisphere’ stands for 
the countries with latitude greater than 10. Each regression includes country and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by country. *** p < 0.01, ** p 
< 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
 Dependent variable: Manufacturing output, t (in log growth rates) 
 GDP per capita  < $10,000    &   Northern Hemisphere 
 agricultural  low trade  low credit  latitude > 20 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11)  (12) (13) (14) 
Log yield 
growth, t 
 
.04 
[0.26] 
.01 
[0.08] 
.06 
[0.33] 
  
.13 
[0.53] 
.06 
[0.22] 
-.08 
[-0.22] 
  
.11 
[0.72] 
.11 
[0.54] 
 
.15 
[0.65] 
.22 
[0.85] 
.25 
[0.57] 
Log yield 
growth, t-1 
.24** 
[2.15] 
.25** 
[2.33] 
.24** 
[2.07] 
.26** 
[2.32] 
 
.27* 
[1.95] 
.31** 
[2.15] 
.36** 
[1.97] 
.33* 
[1.73] 
 
.25** 
[2.06] 
.29*** 
[3.02] 
.28** 
[2.53] 
 
.26** 
[2.24] 
.42* 
[1.84] 
.41* 
[1.67] 
Log yield 
growth, t-2 
  
-.04 
[-0.36] 
-.02 
[-0.18] 
   
.12 
[0.98] 
.03 
[0.15] 
   
.01 
[0.07] 
  
.18 
[1.22] 
.01 
[0.03] 
Log yield 
growth, t-3 
   
.02 
[0.18] 
    
-.17 
[-0.77] 
       
-.22 
[-1.00] 
Log exchange 
rate growth, t 
-.36*** 
[-3.38] 
-.36*** 
[-3.44] 
-.35*** 
[-3.29] 
-.35*** 
[-3.39] 
 
-.42*** 
[-3.54] 
-.40*** 
[-3.13] 
-.41*** 
[-3.20] 
-.43*** 
[-3.23] 
 
-.32*** 
[-3.47] 
-.32*** 
[-3.42] 
-.31*** 
[-3.29] 
 
-.13 
[-1.12] 
-.12 
[-0.98] 
-.12 
[-0.95] 
R-squared 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26  0.25 0.27 0.24 0.18  0.21 0.22 0.22  0.21 0.16 0.10 
Observations 447 447 434 423  376 376 376 362  380 380 365  448 433 419 
Appendices
A Equilibrium Solution Derivations
A.1 Baseline model
A representative agent has a Cobb-Douglas Stone-Geary utility function:
U = (qa − γa)αq1−αm , 0 < α < 1,
Solving the utility maximization problem subject to the budget constraint, paqa + qm = I,
yields the following expenditure equation for manufacturing:
Em = (1− α)(I − paγa)
On the production side, recall that, given prices, each sector chooses Ki and Li to maximize
profits,
pii = pifi(Ki, Li)− wLi − rKi,
where i = a,m. First order conditions are then given by,
w = (1− βm)zm(Km
Lm
)βm = pa(1− βa)za(Ka
La
)βa (A.1)
r = βmzm(
Km
Lm
)βm−1 = paβaza(
Ka
La
)βa−1 (A.2)
Using Equations (A.1) and (A.2), both pa and Km can be expressed in terms of Lm as follows:
Km =
βm(1− βa)LmK
βa(1− βm)L+ (βm − βa)Lm (A.3)
pa =
zmβm
zaβa
(Km
Lm
)βm−1( L−Lm
K−Km )
βa−1
= zmβm
zaβa
[βa(1−βm)L+(βm−βa)Lm
K
]βa−βm [βm(1− βa)]βm−1[βa(1− βm)]1−βa
(A.4)
Using the market clearing condition and Equations (A.1) - (A.4), I obtain the following:
zmK
βm
m L
1−βm
m = (1− α)(wL+ rK − paγa)
= (1− α)[(1− βm)zm(KmLm )βmL+ βmzm(KmLm )βm−1K
− zmβm
zaβa
(Km
Lm
)βm−1( L−Lm
K−Km )
βa−1γa]
(A.5)
Substituting Equation (A.3) forKm in Equation (A.5), I obtain the following implicit solution
for Lm,
1
za
· γa
Kβa
= G(Lm), (A.6)
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where G(Lm) =
L−λ−1·Lm
[L+
(βm−βa)
βa(1−βm)Lm]
βa
and λ = (1−α)(1−βm)
(1−α)(1−βm)+α(1−βa) . Other remaining equilibrium
allocations can be easily obtained from knowing the equilibrium value L∗m.
1
In order to illustrate the intuition about the model, Figure A.1 presents how equilibrium
output changes in response to a decrease in agricultural productivity using production pos-
sibility frontiers (PPF) and Stone-Geary utility indifference curves. The y-axis and x-axis
represent the amounts of agricultural and manufacturing goods, respectively. The outer PPF
shrinks vertically to the inner one in response to a negative shock to agricultural productivity.
The top two Stone-Geary indifference curves have a high level of subsistence requirement,
while the two lower indifference curves have a low subsistence requirement. Equilibrium
output occurs at points where the indifference curves and PPFs are tangent. The equilib-
rium manufacturing output that is associated with the higher level of subsistence falls from
M1 to M2 in response to a decrease in agricultural productivity. Meanwhile, the one with
the lower level of subsistence decreases from m1 to m2. From the figure, it can be noted
that M1/M2 > m1/m2. The change in equilibrium in response to a shock to agricultural
productivity is largest when the country is producing mostly agricultural goods (near the
y-axis), and when the country’s income is close to the subsistence level (Implication 2).
How does the result differ if one assumes the subsistence requirement γa to be zero?
The utility function then becomes the Cobb-Douglas utility function, and a new general
equilibrium solution for Lm can be obtained using Equation (7) as follows:
Lm = λ · L = (1− α)(1− βm)
(1− α)(1− βm) + α(1− βa)L (A.7)
Note that consumers pay (1 − α) · I for manufacturing, and the Cobb-Douglas production
technology implies that fraction (1 − βm) of (1 − α) · I is spent on labor in manufactur-
ing. Similarly, fraction (1 − βa) of α · I is spent on labor in agriculture. Thus, Equation
(A.7) implies that the manufacturing employment share equals the portion of spending for
manufacturing employment out of spending on total employment.2 Unlike the case with
Stone-Geary preferences, note that Equation (A.7) does not involve productivity terms za
and zm. This implies that agricultural productivity does not affect manufacturing output
under the assumption of Cobb-Douglas preferences.
A.2 Extension: CES preferences
Consider a more generalized case with a CES Stone-Geary preference,
U = [α(qa − γa)(σ−1)/σ + (1− α)q(σ−1)/σm ]σ/(σ−1)
1L∗a = L− L∗m;K∗m = βm(1−βa)L
∗
mK
βa(1−βm)L+(βm−βa)L∗m ;K
∗
A = K −K∗m; p∗a = zmβmzaβa (
K∗m
L∗m
)βm−1( L−L
∗
m
K−K∗m )
βa−1
q∗m = zmK
∗
m
βmL∗m
βm−1; q∗a = zaK
∗
a
βaL∗a
βa−1
2Similarly, the equilibrium allocation for capital in manufacturing is,
Km =
(1− α)βm
αβa + (1− α)βmK
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Solving the utility maximization problem subject to the budget constraint paqa + qm = I
yields the following manufacturing expenditure equation:
Em = α̂m(σ, pa) · (I − paγa),
where α̂m(σ, pa) =
(1−α)σ
ασp1−σa +(1−α)σ . α̂m(σ, pa) indicates the share of residual income spent on
manufacturing, and α̂m(σ, pa)→ (1− α), as σ → 1.
The market clearing condition and Equations (A.1) - (A.4) yields the following:
zmK
βm
m L
1−βm
m = α̂m(σ, pa)(wL+ rK − paγa)
= α̂m(σ, pa)[(1− βm)zm(KmLm )βmL+ βmzm(KmLm )βm−1K
− zmβm
zaβa
(Km
Lm
)βm−1( L−Lm
K−Km )
βa−1γa]
(A.8)
By substituting Equation (A.3) and (A.4) for Km and pa in Equation (A.8), I obtain the
following implicit solution for Lm:
1
za
· γa
Kβa
= G˜(Lm) (A.9)
, where G˜(Lm) =
L−λ2(pa)−1·Lm
[L+
(βm−βa)
βa(1−βm)Lm]
βa
; λ2(pa(Lm)) =
α̂m(σ,pa)(1−βm)
α̂m(σ,pa)(1−βm)+α̂a(σ,pa)(1−βa)
; pa(Lm) =
zmβm
zaβa
[βa(1−βm)L+(βm−βa)Lm
K
]βa−βm [βm(1− βa)]βm−1[βa(1− βm)]1−βa .
In order to clearly see how the substitution effect with σ > 1 can change the volatility
pattern, I increase the value of α to 0.5, and generate new simulation results. Figure A.1
plots the elasticity of manufacturing output with respect to agricultural productivity against
the residual income I − paγa as a percentage of total income.3 Consistent with the analysis,
the elasticity curve for the CES model is placed lower than the one for the baseline model,
and both elasticities are decreasing with income levels due to declining income effects. Note
that the elasticity of the CES model hits zero when the residual income share is about 28%.
This point is where the positive sign income effect equals the negative sign substitution ef-
fect. After passing this point, the substitution effect dominates, thus the sign of the elasticity
becomes negative.
Figure A.2 displays manufacturing output volatility against income levels, and it shows
that the volatility pattern is U-shaped for the CES case.4 Note that the level of volatility
is zero when the share of residual income is about 28%, the point at which the elasticity
becomes zero in Figure A.1. For the range where the residual income share is less than
28%, the level of volatility decreases with income levels as the elasticity decreases. When
3For the simulation, I set za = 1, and K = 1. The elasticities are calculated as percentage change in
manufacturing output in response to a 1% increase in za. In order to have target residual income, I vary γa.
4In order to plot the volatility curves, I randomly draw za 33 times from a truncated normal distribution
N[0.99,1.01](1, 0.0001). I then simulate equilibrium solutions and calculate the standard deviation of output
growth rates.
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the residual income share is greater than 28%, the volatility starts increasing because the
absolute value of elasticity – although the sign is negative – starts increasing.
A.3 Two-country model
Consider a world economy consisting of two countries of the baseline model type, indexed
by c = H,F . The two countries produce homogenous manufacturing and agricultural goods,
and engage in free trade with no transportation costs. The countries have the following
aggregate preferences:
UH = (qa,H − LHγa)αq1−αm,H (A.10)
UF = (qa,F − LFγa)αq1−αm,F . (A.11)
Each country’s group of agents maximizes their utility subject to the budget constraint
Ic = paqa,c + qm,c . The production side of each country takes the same Cobb-Douglas
production technology as in the baseline model.
Using the fact that there will be the same relative price pa in both Home and Foreign
countries and Equation (A.4), which is solved for pa in terms of Lm, I can express Lm,F in
terms of Lm,H as follows:
Lm,F = {(za,F zm,H
zm,F za,H
)
1
βa−βm [
βa(1− βm)LH + (βm − βa)Lm,H
KH
]KF − βa(1− βm)LF} · 1
βm − βa
(A.12)
I also use the market clearing condition for the world market. That is, for each sector, the
sum of quantity produced in the world equals the sum of global demand, which yields the
following:
zm,HK
βm
m,HL
1−βm
m,H +zm,FK
βm
m,FL
1−βm
m,F = (1−α)[(wLH+rKH−paLHγa)+(wLF+rKF−paLFγa)] .
(A.13)
Plugging (A.1) - (A.4) and (A.12) into (A.13) will yield an implicit solution for Lm,H .
Small open economy — Now I assume a small open economy where the price is fixed
at the world price, pa = pw. Since the price is fixed, the demand system has no effect on
output, so the resource allocations and manufacturing output are entirely determined by the
supply side. Thus, I consider only the production side to obtain equilibrium solutions of
interest. First order conditions of the production side are,
w = (1− βm)zm(Km
Lm
)βm = pw(1− βa)za(Ka
La
)βa (A.14)
r = βmzm(
Km
Lm
)βm−1 = pwβaza(
Ka
La
)βa−1 (A.15)
We can solve for pw using Equation (A.15),
pw =
zmβm
zaβa
(
Km
Lm
)βm−1(
L− Lm
K −Km )
βa−1 (A.16)
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Plugging (A.3) into (A.16) to replace Km with a function of Lm yields:
pw =
zmβm
zaβa
[
βa(1− βm)L+ (βm − βa)Lm
K
]βa−βm [βm(1− βa)]βm−1[βa(1− βm)]βa−1 (A.17)
By rearranging the terms, I obtain the closed form solution for Lm,
Lm = (
zm
za
· λ3
pw
)
1
βm−βa · K
βm − βa −
βa(1− βm)
βm − βa · L (A.18)
B Implications for Aggregate TFP
The baseline model predicts that some labor and capital resources move away from man-
ufacturing and into agriculture in response to a negative shock to agricultural productivity.
This implication is somewhat counterintuitive, as resources are moving toward the sector
with declining productivity. How would such a reallocation pattern affect aggregate TFP?
Meanwhile, it has been seen that under the small open economy the direction of resource flow
is the opposite, which will affect aggregate productivity differently. This section investigates
how the varying patterns of resource reallocations affect aggregate productivity.
Using the same simulation setting which was used to investigate manufacturing output
growth rates in response to a -15% productivity shock (see Table A.6), I obtain growth rates
in equilibrium aggregate productivity under the two cases: the baseline model and the small
open economy model (see columns 3 and 6 of Table A.6). In both cases, the base price is
country specific and is set at the equilibrium price obtained in the baseline model setting at
time 0 (i.e., before the -15% shock). As for the world price (the agricultural price relative
to the manufacturing price in the world) for the small open economy, I assume that the
world relative price is country specific rather than common to all countries, due to different
consumption baskets across countries (for example, the quality and price of manufacturing
goods that are consumed are higher in rich countries). Thus, the world price each country
faces is set at the same base price which is the equilibrium price obtained under the baseline
model setting at time 0. Note that the primary purpose of setting the world price in this
way is to make aggregate output in the two cases comparable. For example, we will see that
productivity effects (or, within-sector effecst) are the same in the baseline model and in the
small open economy.
The simulation results then show that in response to the 15% decrease in agricultural
productivity, there is much less reduction in aggregate TFP in the small open economy.5
For example, in Ethiopia, aggregate TFP decreases by 13.5% in the closed economy, while
it decreases only by 7.6% in the small open economy. How does the same 15% decrease in
agricultural productivity result in a larger reduction in aggregate productivity in the closed
economy? To investigate this, I decompose the aggregate TFP growth into the productivity
effect (within-sector effect) resulting from declining agricultural productivity, and the share
5Since I use static models where total capital stock and labor are fixed, the aggregate TFP growth rate
is equal to the aggregate output growth rate.
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effect (between-sector effect) which operates by reallocating resources.6
Decompositions of aggregate TFP growth — Consider a Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion for aggregate output with aggregate total factor productivity z,
Y = z ·KβL1−β (B.1)
Next, aggregate output can be written as the sum of each sector’s output,
Y =
∑
i
Yi , i = a,m (B.2)
By dividing Equation (B.2) by KβL1−β, I can express the aggregate TFP as the weighted
sum of sector-specific TFPs as follows:
z =
∑
i
Yi
Kβii L
1−βi
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
zi
· (K
βi
i L
1−βi
i
KβL1−β
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Si
=
∑
i
zi · Si , (B.3)
where the weight Si is the ratio of the sector i input combination to the aggregate input
combination, which I will interpret as sector share.
Using Equation (B.3), we can decompose the change in aggregate TFP into within- and
between-sector effects as follows,
(zt − zt−1) =
∑
i
(zi,t − zi,t−1) · Si,t−1 +
∑
i
(Si,t − Si,t−1) · zi,t (B.4)
Although there are other ways to decompose the change in TFP, I choose this way since
it fits well in the theoretical context. Equation (B.4) can be thought of as the change of
aggregate TFP through the following two steps as an example. Imagine a drought that
lowers agricultural productivity. First, sector-specific productivity changes from zi,t−1 to zi,t
(in this case, manufacturing productivity stays the same), while labor and capital resources
have not yet been reallocated, so initial sector shares are fixed at Si,t−1. Second, having seen
the realized productivity zi,t, resources move between the sectors and sector shares adjust
from Si,t−1 to Si,t.
Next, I divide Equation (B.4) by zt−1, to rewrite it in terms of percentage changes,
%∆z =
∑
i
∆zi(
Si,t−1
zt−1
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Productivity effect
+
∑
i
∆Si(
zi,t
zt−1
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Share effect
(B.5)
The first term, the productivity effect, shows the contribution of sector-specific TFP changes
to aggregate TFP growth. Sectors either with large changes in their productivity or with
6I follow the TFP growth decomposition method introduced by Bernard and Jones (1996) but slightly
modified to fit the context of this paper.
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large sector shares will have larger productivity effects. The second component, the share
effect, captures the indirect effect on the aggregate TFP growth that operates by reallocating
resources.
Table A.6 reports the decompositions of aggregate TFP growth in response to a 15%
decrease in agricultural productivity. There are two dimensions to compare these results:
comparison between closed and open economies, and comparison across countries. Recall
that under the closed economy labor and capital resources move toward agriculture when
its productivity is declining. Such pattern of resource reallocation negatively contributes
to aggregate TFP growth, so the share effects are negative (column 3 of Table A.6). For
example, in Ethiopia, the share effect is -2.2% in the closed economy. On the other hand,
the share effect in the small open economy is +3.8% (column 6). In short, the country could
have done better by more than 6%, if it had been able to freely allocate resources toward
the sector that became relatively more productive.
The theory under the closed economy also implies that the effect of agricultural produc-
tivity on resource reallocations decreases as the subsistence requirement relative to income
decreases. This is reflected by the decreasing share effect (column 3 of Table A.6). Pro-
ductivity effects are the same in both closed and small open economies (columns 1 and 4).
Meanwhile, across countries the productivity effect decreases with income levels due to the
decreasing share of agriculture in the economy.
C AModel with Land and Intermediate Inputs in Agri-
culture
Recall that the agricultural production function in the baseline model had only labor and
capital inputs. This section studies a new model that considers land and an intermediate
input, which is supplied by the manufacturing sector, in agricultural production. To simplify
the algebra, I assume that only labor is used in manufacturing. The demand-side setup and
all other assumptions are the same as in the baseline model. Note that this model setup
closely resembles the one used by Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008).
Production Technologies — The agricultural production function is assumed as follows:
Ya = fa(La, X) = zaX
β1(Z1−β2Lβ2a )
1−β1 (C.1)
where Z and X are land and the intermediate input from manufacturing. I assume that
the land supply is fixed, so labor in agriculture exhibits decreasing returns. The production
function for manufacturing is
Ym = zmLm (C.2)
Following Restuccia et al.(2008), I assume that px units of manufacturing good are needed
to produce 1 unit of X, where px is given outside the model. Since the manufacturing is
treated as the numeraire, px can be considered as the price of intermediate inputs. Also, I
assume that wa = wm to make the model comparable with the baseline model. In addition,
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La +Lm = L and Ym = qm +X. Note that profit maximization of the manufacturing sector
requires w = zm. The agricultural sector choses La and X to maximize the profit
pia = pazaX
β1(Z1−β2Lβ2a )
1−β1 − wLa − pxX (C.3)
This yields the following first-order conditions:
pa(1− β1)β2zaXβ1Z(1−β2)(1−β1)Lβ2(1−β1)−1a − w = 0 (C.4)
β1pazaX
β1−1(Z1−β2Lβ2a )
1−β1 − px = 0 (C.5)
Preferences — The demand-side is the same as the baseline model. A representative agent
has a Cobb-Douglas Stone-Geary utility function:
U = (qa − γa)αq1−αm , 0 < α < 1, (C.6)
where γa is a subsistence requirement for agricultural goods. The agent earns income I =
wL = zmL by inelastically supplying L units of labor, and the budget constraint is given by:
paqa + qm = I. (C.7)
Solving the utility maximization problem of the representative agent subject to the budget
constraint yields expenditure equations for food and manufacturing as follows:
Ea = α(I − paγa) + paγa (C.8)
Em = (1− α)(I − paγa) (C.9)
Competitive equilibrium — The competitive equilibrium of the closed economy is a set of
allocations {La, Lm, qa, qm, X} and prices {w, r, pa}, such that, given the prices, (1) {qa, qm}
solve the utility maximization problem of the representative agent, (2) {La, Lm, X} solve
the profit maximization problem of each sector, and (3) all markets clear. Each equilibrium
allocation can then be expressed by the eight parameters, K,L, Z, px, za, zm, βa, βM , α, and
γa. Using (C.4) and (C.5), we can express pa and X in terms of La and other parameters as
follows:
pa = (
zm
za(1− β1)β2 )
1−β1(
px
zaβ1
)β1(
La
Z
)(1−β1)(1−β2) (C.10)
X =
zmβ1
β2(1− β1)pxLa (C.11)
Combining (C.9) and the market clearing condition yields:
αI + (1− α)paγa = pafa(La, X) = pazaXβ1(Z1−β2Lβ2a )1−β1 (C.12)
Plugging (C.10) and (C.11) into (C.12) leads to an implicit solution of La,
αzmL−( zm
za(1− β1)β2 )
1−β1(
px
zaβ1
)β1(
La
Z
)(1−β1)(1−β2){za( zmβ1La
β2(1− β1)px )
β1(Z1−β2Lβ2a )
1−β1−(1−α)γa} = 0
(C.13)
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Quantitative analysis — Following Restuccia et al. (2008), the labor income share in
agriculture β2 is set at 0.7. Also, the authors selected β1 = 0.4 to match the intermediate
input to output ratio for the U.S. economy, and I follow this. In addition, I assume px = 1
and Z = 1. For all other remaining parameters, I use the same values used for the baseline
model simulations as listed in Table 1.
With the given parameters, I simulate the new model equilibrium outcome, and find
that the key implications of this model are unchanged compared to the baseline model
results. That is, when there is a decrease in agricultural productivity, resources move toward
agriculture and out of manufacturing, reducing manufacturing output. This effect decreases
with income levels, thus output fluctuations are higher in poor countries. Importantly, like
the baseline model results, the new model results show that significant differences exist in
manufacturing output growth rates across poor and rich countries. For example, Ghana and
India experience 19% and 9% decrease in manufacturing output, respectively, while the U.S.
experiences only a 1% decrease in manufacturing output.
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Appendix Figures and Tables 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.1 Changes in equilibrium quantities in response to 
a negative shock to agricultural productivity 
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Figure A.2. Elasticity of manufacturing output with respect to agricultural productivity, against residual 
income (% of total income) 
 
 
Figure A.3. Manufacturing output volatility against residual income (% of total income) 
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Table A.1. The negative relationship between volatilities and per capita GDP 
 
 Dependent variables 
Manufacturing 
output volatility 
Aggregate 
output volatility 
Log PGDP 
-.030** 
[-2.80] 
-.007*** 
[-3.11] 
Log population 
-.007 
[.76] 
-.005*** 
[-2.69] 
Constant 
.503*** 
[3.85] 
.16*** 
[5.56] 
R-squared 0.095 0.168 
Observations 80 80 
Note - OLS estimation results. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
The standard deviations of manufacturing output growth rates and 
per capita GDP growth rates over the time period 1970-2002 are 
used as dependent variables. The explanatory variable Log PGDP 
 is the average value of per capita GDP over the period in log. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
70 
 
Table A.2. List of sectors 
1 Food and beverages; Tobacco 
2 Textiles; Wearing apparel, fur; Leather, leather products and foot wear 
3 
Wood products (excl. furniture); Paper and paper products;  
Printing and publishing; Furniture, manufacturing n.e.c. ; Recycling 
4 Coke, refined petroleum products, nuclear fuel; Chemicals and chemical products; 
5 Rubber and plastics products; Non-metallic mineral products 
6 
Basic metals; Fabricated metal products; Machinery and equipment n.e.c.;  
Office, accounting and computing machinery 
7 
Electrical machinery and apparatus; Radio, television and communication equipment;  
Medical, precision and optical instruments 
8 Motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers; Other transport equipment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
71 
 
Table A.3. Standard deviations of the predicted manufacturing output growth rates  
Countries 
Predicted 
Volatility 1 (%) 
(projections of rainfall 
onto yields) 
 (1) 
Predicted 
Volatility 2 (%)  
(endogenous 
variable, yields) 
 (2) 
(Data)  
Volatility (%) 
 (3) 
 
Ratio1 
col1/col3 (%) 
(4) 
Ratio2 
col2/col3 (%) 
(5) 
Burkina Faso 3.9 4.5 11.7 33.1 38.3 
Bangladesh 6.9 7.1 25.1 27.6 28.5 
India 5.7 5.8 10.2 56.3 57.3 
Morocco 6.3 13.9 19.1 33.0 72.7 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 6.8 6.2 20.5 33.0 30.2 
Philippines 6.0 6.3 16.9 35.4 37.0 
Algeria 6.0 7.0 18.7 32.0 37.3 
Sample Average 5.4 7.1 22.8 31.3 44.0 
Notes: Volatility in percentage terms can be understood simply as the standard deviation of growth rates in percentage. 
Column 1 presents predicted volatility using projections of rainfall onto yields, while column 2 uses the endogenous variable 
itself, crop yield data. Volatility values in column 3 are computed directly from the data over the same sample. Column 4 (5) 
values are obtained from column 1 (2) values divided by column 3 values. The last row displays the mean values across the 
sample countries.    
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Table A.4 Domestic Productivity Shocks and Crop Prices (instrumented with rainfall) 
 Dependent variables (in log growth rates) 
Wheat 
price 
 
OLS 
(1) 
Wheat 
price 
 
IV 
(2) 
Maize 
price 
 
IV 
(3) 
Barley 
price 
 
IV 
(4) 
Soybean 
price 
 
IV 
(5) 
Sorghum 
price 
 
IV 
(6) 
Rice 
price 
 
IV 
(7) 
Log yield 
growth, t 
-.17*** 
[-3.01] 
-.75*** 
[-2.90] 
-.93** 
[-2.47] 
-.81*** 
[-2.77] 
-.12 
[-.48] 
-.83** 
[-2.15] 
.12 
[.38] 
Log yield 
growth, t-1 
-.13*** 
[-2.68] 
-.69** 
[-1.97] 
-.60 
[-1.42] 
-.80* 
[-1.83] 
-.47*** 
[-3.51] 
-1.11** 
[-2.21] 
-.53* 
[-1.91] 
Log exchange 
rate growth, t 
-.17* 
[-1.76] 
-.20* 
[-1.80] 
.04 
[.21] 
-.21* 
[-1.86] 
.14 
[.76] 
-.32** 
[-1.43] 
.06 
[.37] 
R-Squared .32 -.20 .00 .00 .08 .01 .04 
Observations 1,103 1,103 1,283 1,020 732 670 968 
Notes: T-statistics are in brackets. Each observation is a country-year. The sample includes all countries, because 
the effect of productivity shocks on crop prices exists with magnitudes not very different across income levels (see 
column 5 in Table 2). The sample refers to 1961 – 2008, and area-weighted rainfall is used as instrument. Each 
regression includes country and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by country.  *** p < 0.01, 
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table A.5 Two-country Model 
(A 15% decrease in agricultural productivity in home country) 
Foreign country size 
C  
Changes in home country equilibrium 
%∆La,H
∗  %∆Lm,H
∗  %∆qm,H
∗  
0.01 + 11% - 56% - 53% 
0.20 + 2% - 22% - 21% 
0.25 + 1% - 8% - 7% 
0.30 - 1% + 11% + 10% 
0.35 - 2% + 36% + 34% 
0.50 - 5% + 225% + 209% 
Note: 𝐶 indicates the size of the foreign country relative to the home country (e.g., 𝐶 = 0.01                                              
means that the foreign country’s size is 1% of the home country’s size). 
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Table A.6. Changes in aggregate TFP 
(A 15% decrease in agricultural productivity) 
Country 
 Baseline model  Small open economy model 
 
Productivity 
effect 
(1) 
Share 
effect 
(2) 
%∆TFP 
(3)  
Productivity 
effect 
(1) 
Share 
effect 
(2) 
%∆TFP 
(3) 
Ethiopia  - 11.32% - 2.21% - 13.54%  - 11.32% + 3.77% - 7.56% 
Ghana  - 7.51% - 1.38% - 8.89%  - 7.51% + 4.16% - 3.34% 
Malawi  - 7.33% - 1.35% - 8.68%  - 7.33% + 4.14% - 3.19% 
Bangladesh  - 3.38% - .57% - 3.94%  -3.38% + 2.69% - .69% 
India  - 3.59% - .61% - 4.19%  -3.59% + 2.81% - .78% 
Portugal  - 1.79% - .27% - 2.1%  -1.79% + 1.59% - .2% 
United States  - 0.77% - .1% - .9%  - .77% + .74% - .04% 
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Table A.7 Rainfall and Crop Yield (first-stage results, 1961-2008) 
  
Dependent variable: Crop yield, t (in log growth rates) 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa only 
 
 GDP per 
capita  
< $4,000 
 GDP per capita < $10,000  
GDP per 
capita > 
$10,000 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Excluded 
(4) 
Northern 
hemisphere 
 
(5)  (6) 
LogRainfallGrowth, t 
.46*** 
[8.97] 
 
.36*** 
[12.69] 
 
.28*** 
[12.97] 
.21*** 
[9.10] 
.26*** 
[9.11] 
 
.08*** 
[3,50] 
TropicalRegion  ×  
LogRainfallGrowth,t  
-.68 
[-1.65] 
 
-.31*** 
[-4.85] 
 
-.23*** 
[-4.68] 
-.15*** 
[-3.26] 
-.17** 
[-2.21] 
 
-.23 
[-.79] 
LogRainfallGrowth,t-1 
.03 
[.06] 
 
.06** 
[2.07] 
 
.03 
[1.31] 
.03 
[1.23] 
.03 
[1.16] 
 
.01 
[.37] 
TropicalRegion  ×   
LogRainfallGrowth,t-1  
.05 
[.12] 
 
-.03 
[-.52] 
 
-.01 
[-.22] 
-.01 
[-.12] 
-.01 
[-.19] 
 
-.07 
[-.24] 
R-squared .17  .12  .09 .07 .10  .12 
Observations 1,119  2,378  3,457 2,338 1,790  1,259 
Notes: T-statistics are in brackets. Each observation is a country-year. ‘Northern hemisphere’ represents the countries with 
latitude greater than 10. Each regression includes country and year fixed effects. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table A.8 Manufacturing output (second-stage results, 1961-2008) 
 
Dependent variable: Manufacturing output, t (in log growth) 
Northern  hemisphere  All countries 
 all 
low credit 
agricultural  
low credit 
all 
PGDP < 
$4,000 
low 
trade 
high  
trade 
agricultural 
 
OLS 
(1) 
IV 
(2) 
IV 
(3) 
IV 
(4) 
IV 
(5) 
 
IV 
(6) 
IV 
(7) 
IV 
(8) 
Log yield 
growth, t-1 
.07**  
[2.15] 
.20*  
[1.72] 
.30* 
[1.75] 
.24* 
[1.93] 
.27** 
[2.16] 
 
.33**  
[2.42] 
.15  
[.35] 
.45***  
[2.72] 
Log yield 
growth, t 
.10**  
[2.05] 
-.08 
[-.49] 
.03 
[.18] 
.31* 
[1.93] 
-.01 
[-.08] 
 
.01 
[.04] 
.27 
[.33] 
.06 
[.31] 
Log exchange 
rate growth, t 
-.36*** 
[-3.12] 
-.35*** 
[-3.09] 
-.49*** 
[-4.27] 
-.63*** 
[-3.49] 
-.49*** 
[-4.09] 
 
-.18** 
[-2.27] 
-.35*** 
[-2.95] 
-.54*** 
[-4.77] 
R-squared .19 .13 .22 .26 .19  .15 .49 23 
Observations 1,229 1,229 769 495 878  647 302 745 
Notes: Each observation is a country-year. ‘Agricultural’ represents observations with shares of agriculture production out of 
GDP greater than 10%. ‘Low trade’ represents observations with export shares in manufacturing output less than 20%.  ‘Low 
credit’ represents observations with private credit (% of total GDP) less than 30%.  Each regression includes country and year 
fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by country. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table A.9 Employment in Manufacturing (second-stage results, 1961-2008) 
 Dependent variable: Employment in Manufacturing, t (in log growth rates) 
 GDP per capita  < $10,000  
GDP per capita 
< $4,000 
 
GDP per 
capita 
> $10,000 
 Northern hemisphere 
Northern 
hemisphere* 
Equator  
Northern 
hemisphere 
Northern 
hemisphere* 
 
Northern 
hemisphere 
 
OLS 
(1) 
baseline 
 
IV 
(2) 
Sub- 
Saharan 
Africa 
Excluded 
(3) 
low 
credit 
(4) 
IV 
(5) 
IV 
(6)  
IV 
(7) 
IV 
(8)  
IV 
(9) 
Log yield 
growth, t 
.05** 
[2.26] 
.14** 
[2.35] 
.11* 
[1.87] 
.14** 
[2.13] 
.10* 
[1,75] 
-.14 
[-1.08] 
 
.21*** 
[2.62] 
.13** 
[2.37] 
 
-.35 
[-1.50] 
Log yield 
growth, t-1 
.02 
[.70] 
-.06 
[-1.16] 
-.05 
[-.86] 
-.07 
[-.98] 
-.03 
[-.41] 
.02 
[.34] 
 
-.01 
[-.17] 
.08 
[.94] 
 
-.18 
[-.63] 
Log exchange 
rate growth, t 
-.04** 
[-2.17] 
-.05** 
[-2.51] 
-.05*** 
[-2.88] 
-.02 
[-.89] 
-.05** 
[-2.56] 
-.02 
[-.98] 
 
-.02 
[-.76] 
-.03 
[-.82] 
 
-.06 
[-1.27] 
R-squared .16 .09 .12 .14 .14 .08  .07 .18  -- 
Observations 1,043 1,043 992 609 771 1,036  638 427  888 
Notes: T-statistics are in brackets. Each observation is a country-year. ‘Northern hemisphere (Northern 
hemisphere*)’ stands for the countries with latitude greater than 10 (20). ‘Equator’ stands for the countries whose 
latitude is between -20 and 20. ‘Low credit’ represents observations with private credit (% of total GDP) less than 
30%. Each regression includes country and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by country. *** 
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table A.10 Capital investments in manufacturing (second-stage results, 1961-2008) 
 Dependent variable: Capital investment in Manufacturing, t (in log growth rates) 
 GDP per capita  < $10,000  
GDP per capita 
< $4,000 
 
GDP per capita 
< $15,000 
GDP per capita 
> $15,000 
  
OLS 
(1) 
IV 
(2) 
low 
trade 
 
IV 
(3) 
 
IV 
(4)  
IV 
(5) 
IV 
(6) 
Log yield 
growth, t-1 
-.06 
[-.54] 
1.31* 
[1.92] 
1.49 
[1.61] 
 
1.43* 
[1.73] 
 
1.16* 
[1.72] 
-.14 
[.41] 
Log yield 
growth, t 
-.10 
[-.98] 
.56 
[.67] 
1.79 
[1.64] 
 
.07 
[.09] 
 
.38 
[.51] 
-.40 
[-1.22] 
Log exchange 
rate growth, t 
-.27*** 
[-3.75] 
-.24*** 
[-3.05] 
-.23** 
[-2.11] 
 
-.46*** 
[-3.43] 
 
-.24*** 
[-3.45] 
-.1.00*** 
[-8.30] 
Observations 1,004 1,004 481  555  1,189 701 
Notes: T-statistics are in brackets. Each observation is a country-year. ‘Low trade’ represents observations with 
export shares in manufacturing output less than 20%. Each regression includes country and year fixed effects.         
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table A.11 List of 118 countries 
Afghanistan Germany  Kazakhstan Poland 
Angola  Denmark  Kenya  Portugal 
Albania  Dominican Republic Kyrgyz Republic Paraguay 
United Arab Emirates Algeria  Cambodia Romania 
Argentina Ecuador  Korea, Rep. Russian Federation 
Armenia  Egypt, Arab Rep. Lao PDR  Sudan 
Australia  Eritrea  Liberia  Senegal 
Austria  Spain  Libya  Somalia 
Azerbaijan Estonia  Sri Lanka  Suriname 
Burundi  Ethiopia  Lithuania  Slovak Republic 
Belgium  Finland  Latvia  Slovenia 
Benin  France  Morocco  Sweden 
Burkina Faso Gabon  Madagascar Syrian Arab Republic 
Bangladesh United Kingdom Mexico  Thailand 
Bulgaria  Georgia  Mongolia  Tajikistan 
Bolivia  Ghana  Mozambique Tunisia 
Brazil  Greece  Malawi  Turkey 
Botswana Guatemala Malaysia  Tanzania 
Central African Republic Honduras  Nigeria  Uganda 
Canada  Croatia  Nicaragua Ukraine 
Switzerland Haiti  Netherlands Uruguay 
Chile  Hungary  Norway  United States 
China  Indonesia Nepal  Venezuela, RB 
Cote d'Ivoire India  New Zealand Vietnam 
Cameroon Ireland  Oman  Yemen, Rep. 
Congo, Rep. Iran, Islamic Rep. Pakistan  South Africa 
Colombia  Iraq  Panama  Zambia 
Costa Rica Italy  Peru  Zimbabwe 
Cuba  Jordan  Philippines  
Czech Republic Japan  Papua New Guinea  
 
